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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, a wave of political change has washed over the 
world with successful democratization movements bringing a transformation to the 
structures of government in all comers of the globe. As part of this process, the use of 
the media has played a significant role. As the world has moved in the direction of 
democratic change, there is a small number of countries where attempts to bring 
democracy have so far failed to bear fruit despite determined efforts by highly-
committed opposition movements aided by continuous pressure from powerful 
members of the international community. One such country is Burma, renamed 
Myanmar by its military rulers. There, too, the media have played a powerful role in 
the battle between the authorities and the pro-democracy opposition. This use of the 
media for political purposes in Burma will be the focus of my thesis. 
The situation in Burma stands in sharp contrast to the global trend that has 
dominated political change since the end of the Cold War. In Latin America, for 
example, a democratically elected leader now governs every country with the 
exception of Cuba. In Asia, nations whose autocratic rulers seemed invincible after 
decades in power, like Indonesia, have undergone democratic change as have other 
countries once caught in the grip of Cold War politics, such as South Korea and 
Cambodia. In Africa, dramatic democratic transformations have taken place in 
countries like South Africa, Nigeria and others. Clearly, new democracies in the 
developing world are far from perfect, but the trend toward establishing a political 
system that gives a greater voice and an active role to the people has been moving 
into place. 
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One of the most striking aspects of the political conflict pitting the military 
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against the pro-democracy forces in Burma is the critical role played by mass 
communications. With much of the opposition now based outside the country's 
borders, communications with those who remain inside Burma is crucial to its efforts, 
as is communication with active and potential supporters in other countries. In 
addition to traditional media like newspapers, magazines and radio, the opposition 
has embraced the Internet as a major platform for organizing its forces and 
disseminating information. On the other side of the conflict, the strategy of the ruling 
junta is almost a mirror image of its opponents'. 
The military has restricted access to modem media to a greater degree than 
almost any country in the world, with the possible exception of Afghanistan and 
North Korea. The authorities have targeted journalists, sentencing scores of them to 
lengthy prison terms. Authorities produce the kind of information they believe will 
further their political aims. Control of the media is virtually absolute, although 
journalists have achieved some success in developing creative methods of bypassing 
some censorship. 
In the thesis I will examine the role of the media as a political tool in the 
Burmese conflict. I will examine how the parties in the conflict seek to utilize mass 
communications to achieve their political objectives. This is an issue that has not 
received very much attention. Specifically, this thesis will seek to answer the 
question of how Burma's ruling regime and the opposition pro-democracy movement 
each utilize the media to achieve their objectives and, further, how their actions in this 
area fit within the theories of political development. 
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I intend to show the mechanics of controlling the media used by the 
authorities, and the methods used by the opposition to eschew that control. I will 
show how the government utilizes the instruments of communications to assert its 
control and thwart any challenges to its authority. I will describe the techniques used 
by the opposition, with its twin aims of communicating with the population inside 
Burma and drumming up support in the international community. 
While the conflict in Burma can accurately be viewed as one where raw 
power is the issue at stake, political theory can provide some of the concepts that 
make it possible to elucidate the dynamics of Burmese politics. While modernization 
for its own sake is probably not at the center of the regime's goals, the process of 
modernization, which has been studied in some depth by political theorists, offers 
useful insights for the analysis of this case. For this reason, I will show how the use 
of the media as a political tool can be viewed in the context of modernization theory. 
As a point of possible interest I should note that my own attention to this subject was 
awakened by a recent visit to Burma and some of the neighboring countries. After 
years of travels to dozens of countries I had never witnessed the depth of suppression 
of free speech that I saw in Burma. Even in areas of political conflict like Tibet the 
restrictions were far less absolute than in Burma. The contrast with much of the rest 
of the region and with the activities of the Burmese opposition- much of it in 
Thailand - was striking. 
That general impression of a country whose people are subjected to severe 
restrictions in their access to information is corroborated by some existing empirical 
data. The International Telecommunication Union, an organ of the United Nations, 
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compiles statistics on access to telecommunication technology around the world. 
Myanmar (Burma) ranks at or near the bottom in virtually every category. 
In terms of access to the Internet, for example, the ITU1 reports Burma had 
0.21 users for every 10,000 people. (That's about 1 user for every 50,000 people.) 
Perhaps the most apt country to compare it to would be Laos, which had 11.04 users 
per 10,000 inhabitants. That's 52 times more in Laos than in Burma. In another 
Asian extremely impoverished Asian country, Nepal, the comparison is even more 
dramatic. Nepal has 21.70 users per 10000 inhabitants, or about 100 times more than 
Burma. 
The thesis will be structured as follows: First, an introduction, preceding the 
first chapter, will explain to problem to be examined. The section will lay out the 
basic premises for the thesis, describing the question, the methodology to be followed 
and the significance to the discipline of the issue to be studied. 
Chapter One will present the existing theoretical background. This chapter 
will examine the scholarly literature that, to a large degree, constitutes the foundation 
for the thesis, going into some detail on literature dealing with modernization, the role 
of the media in democracies and authoritarian systems, and the role of new 
technologies in political change. The examination of relevant political theory will 
show how different elements from each theory apply to Burma. In discussing the 
predominant views in the field of political development, it will outline the key 
elements emphasized by political science in four different schools of thought, namely, 
modernization theorists, institutionalist theorists, bureaucratic authoritarian theorists, 
and democratic transition theorists. The survey of theories will show which elements 
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from each theory apply to the Burmese case. Similarly, the examination of the 
literature on the media and politics will point to the theoretical and empirical work 
that applies to the Burmese case, looking at work on the role of the media in 
democracy and in the authoritarian and totalitarian systems. 
Chapter Two will provide the necessary political historical context. It will 
describe the background of how Burma reached the current political crisis, describing 
the principal events and political actors steering the course of the nation. The chapter 
will detail the different stages through which the country moved as it became the 
unusual political hybrid it is today, with a military regime in a post-socialist state 
attempting to develop an economy that claims to embrace private property while 
appropriating the assets of the state for the benefit of the military' s efforts to protect 
its position. The political context will also describe the evolution of the press and its 
role in the political system. 
Chapter Three will present a detailed description and analysis of how the 
ruling Junta utilizes the media to exert political control of the country. The mechanics 
of control will be described, and juxtaposed against some of the theoretical 
framework outlined in the review of the literature, explaining how the different 
techniques conform to the political objectives of the authorities within the framework 
of the theories discussed. 
Chapter Four will show the other side of the system. This section will explain 
how the opposition resists government efforts to control the flow of information. 
Further, it will look into the way in which pro-democracy forces use the media in and 
out of the country to further their cause. Again, this will be done against the 
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background of the various political theories. It will show how the efforts of the pro-
democracy movement fit into models of political development. 
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CHAPTER 2: BURMESE POLITICS 
TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN THE AGE OF MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Introduction 
During an age that has brought a sharp increase in the number of 
democracies around the world, the Asian nation of Burma or Myanmar stands as a 
lingering case of a military regime that manages to remain in power despite the 
existence of a well-organized opposition. Military regimes are nothing new, and 
neither are pro-democracy movements. What is new is the current state of mass 
communications. But how exactly does the media come into play in a political 
conflict, specifically, in the Burmese conflict? 
This chapter will examine the theoretical foundation that will guide the 
analysis of how the media is utilized as a political tool in the Burmese conflict. It will 
review the existing literature dealing with political development, as well as the state 
of the literature regarding the media' s influence and politics and the existing material 
focusing on Burma itself. In short, it will look at all literature relevant to the matter at 
hand, namely, what is the role of the media in Burma's conflict. 
Existing Literature 
The available literature on subjects relevant to this work can be divided into 
three areas . First, academic work dealing with development theory will provide the 
principal theoretical basis for this work. Secondly, analyses of the media, particularly 
with respect to its political role and its influence on political change offers useful 
7 
material. And, finally, literature focusing on Burma itself brings a unique look at the 
specific situation at the core of this thesis. 
Development Theory 
A survey of the different schools of thought in the field of development theory 
highlights the uniqueness of Burma's situation. As we will see, each theoretical 
approach includes elements that are applicable to this case. In essence, strands from 
each theory are braided in Burma's political environment. Burma presents a special 
case in many respects. Its recent political history is different from that of the countries 
observed by many of the theorists to create their theories. 
During the country's socialist days it was ruled by the military, rather than by 
a communist party. As will be shown, its military rulers have created governments 
that are quite different from the military regimes studied by political scientists in 
places such as Chile and Argentina. Similarly, the regime has not shown signs of 
being a nepotistic kleptocracy as other Asian countries such as Indonesia under 
Suharto or the Philippines under Marcos where the government focused much of its 
efforts on bringing wealth to the head of the government and his family. Still, 
different aspects of Burma's experience are, in fact, reflected in virtually all theories 
of development. 
As development theorists have sought to understand the sources and potential 
remedies for the ills of countries whose economies have fallen behind, they have 
produced a body of work that plainly relates to the situation in Burma. The country, 
by any quantitative measure, must be categorized as "less developed," or whatever 
the current euphemism for a society riddled with poverty is. The theories that are of 
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the greatest interest here are those dealing with modernization and the related schools 
of thought. 
Modernization Theorists 
In the view of modernization theorists such as Karl Deutsch, political 
development and social change are inextricably linked. Karl Deutsch2 argues that 
social mobilization, brought on by the process of modernization, itself becomes the 
main engine of political change. In Deutsch's model, individuals whose lives are 
changed by developments such as their entry into new markets, come into contact with 
one another, are exposed to new ideas through their personal contacts, relocation, and 
access to the mass media, eventually creating the pressures that bring on political 
modernization. As social mobilization transforms the structures of traditional society, 
pressures on government build. New entities such as trade unions, farmers groups, new 
urban dwellers, create pressure for new institutions and a new role for government and 
bureaucracy. Modernization theorists view the political transformation as one that 
includes changes in attitudes. "Attitudinal modernization implies secularization. 
Individuals differentiate secular (modem) from sacred (traditional) values.''3 Other 
values such as the pursuit of wealth, reliance on science, desire for education, and the 
value of the individual gain ascendance. 
One of the prerequisite engines of modernization is the economy. According 
to Apter 4commercialization and industrialization lead to the development of lending 
and fiscal devices. They produce the need to maintain well financed armies; they 
stimulate scientific advances, which in tum challenge traditional beliefs and 
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undermine the strength of religion and superstition. The primacy of reason emerges, 
fueling the need for education, even as the need for government grows. 
This emphasis on the economy is also found in Rostow' s 5 breakdown of the 
stages leading to modem society, describing the move from the earliest stage of 
limited output agricultural societies to the final stage of mass consumption economies, 
which create new social and political needs. Rostow and other modernization theorists 
also emphasize their liberal view of development as implying a high degree of 
pluralism, bringing together differing ethnic, religious and socio-economic groups, in a 
system of political tolerance built on coalitions, political parties, and other similar 
organizations. 
The emphasis placed by modernization theorists such as Deutsch, who argue 
that mobilization, social change and economic development bring about political 
change is consistent with the Burmese reality, and helps explain the role of the press 
by pointing to the importance of information. Interestingly, this perspective points to 
signs of an incipient victory by the opposition. 
Traditional modernization theory states that political change comes with 
economic progress. The economy, argue modernization theorists, must undergo a 
certain amount of development as a prerequisite for the modernization process to 
move forward. It is in the economy that we can see what may be a partial capitulation 
to progress by the regime or, what is the same, a victory in the making by the 
opposition. 
The Burmese military has endeavored to emphasize traditional culture, 
traditional society, and traditional values. Among those traditions is the belief in 
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economic self-sufficiency. The government has used the media as a primary tool in 
this campaign that combines ethnic and religious symbolism with overt xenophobia. 
At the same time, the opposition has focused much of its efforts into creating 
economic pressures on the country. 
The international economic embargo, crafted in part through the successful 
efforts by the opposition to publicize conditions in Burma, has created a desperate 
economic crisis in the country. The emerging outcome of this campaign is visible in 
the latest efforts by the military to counteract negative publicity and discredit the 
economic embargo. 
Modernization theorists would focus on social mobilization in the country as a 
gauge of change. In Burma, mobilization has taken place as a response to economic 
difficulties, creating a growing class of destitute urban dwellers. The more significant 
mobilization is the one that came after the 1988 and 1990 events, after which a 
massive community of exiled Burmese took shape. Many of these exiles are, in fact, 
the most active members of the opposition. In this respect, modernization theorists 
would rightly point to relocation as one of the forces creating pressure for political 
change, although modernization theorists would likely expect the relocation to 
happen within the country. 
Institutionalist Theorists 
While modernization theorists such as Deutsch focused on social change, 
Institutionalists such as Huntington believed the emphasis belonged elsewhere. In his 
view, the degree of government is more important than its form.6 
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As mobilization takes place, political institutions emerge to manage the new 
demands of society. A key factor in development is the accumulation of power by 
these institutions. Political stability depends on the ability of these institutions to 
handle the new aspirations of the modernizing society. When social change outstrips 
the ability of political institutions, violence and instability ensue. Huntington argues 
that modernity brings stability, but the process of modernization almost inevitably 
produces instability. 
His seminal work Political Order in Changing Societies 7 provides the most 
apt explanation for what is occurring in Burma with regard to the media. As noted, 
Huntington offers the framework for understanding the current situation in Burma. 
His theory-- that the process of modernization engenders political instability-- goes 
to the heart of the battle for and against the free flow of information in Burma. 
A simple explanation for the actions of the Burmese leaders combines these 
views with those of Utilitarian theorists such as William Godwin, James Mill and 
Jeremy Bentham. 8 
Bentham, for example, argues that most governments are guided by self-
interest. If one accepts that simplified premise, along with Huntington ' s view on the 
threat posed by modernization to the political order, it follows that an effort to avoid 
modernization would help avoid some of the instability described by Huntington, and 
would thus be in the self-interest of a government that seeks to perpetuate its hold on 
power. 
In fact, an examination of the way the Burmese authorities have addressed the 
elements of modernization listed by Huntington provides further evidence that a 
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suppression of modernization is the core of government policy. "The principal 
aspects of modernization," Huntington notes, are "urbanization, industrialization, 
secularization, democratization, education, media participation ... "9 Virtually every 
one of these trends has been actively countered by the Burmese Junta, known as the 
State Peace and Development Council or SPDC. The strategy, of course, is far from 
fool proof. The efforts of the opposition, coupled with the managerial ineptitude of 
the Junta, are causing a national economic catastrophe whose magnitude has itself 
become a threat to the survival of the government, requiring it to allow a degree of 
modernization to remain in power. In effect, economic conditions are forcing the 
Junta to allow a degree of modernization. Lack of modernization, in this case, is 
producing instability. 
Still, Huntington's views remain applicable even in that context. "The higher 
the rate of change toward modernity," declares Huntington, "the greater the political 
instability ... " 10 The Junta, then, forced to accept some modernization for reasons of 
economic survival, finds it necessary to slow the rate of change. In order to stop or 
slow the process of modernization, control of the media is indispensable. By 
controlling access to information and manufacturing all mass communications, the 
centralized authority can limit the emergence of a political consciousness and thwart 
claims for political participation. This, incidentally, requires curtailment of the 
educational level of society, something that the SPDC has done by slashing education 
budgets and closing down universities. 
This view of the situation in Burma is backed by other theorists. Alamgir 
notes that modernization theorists such as Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, believe 
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authoritarianism exists in societies that have pre-modem structures. He then reasons 
that authoritarianism will "maintain itself by thwarting modernization, and by 
appealing to traditional culture, values and religion." 11 A look at the policies of the 
Burmese Junta shows an undisputable effort to appeal to traditional culture and raise 
the importance of religion and traditional values. These efforts are to a large degree 
carried out through the government-controlled press. 
The institutionalist school of thought, exemplified by Huntington, considers 
the development of political institutions key to the advent of change. Huntington 
maintains that, "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not 
their form of government but their degree of government." In other words, the 
government's institutions matter more than its philosophy. Then, in the process of 
modernization, "the problem [is] not to hold elections but to create organizations."12 
Viewed in the framework of Huntington's ideas, the pro-democracy 
movement, as the movement seeking to modernize Burma, must utilize the media if it 
is to succeed. "Modernization," as Huntington explains, "involves the tremendous 
expansion of man's knowledge about his environment and the diffusion of this 
knowledge throughout society through increased literacy, mass communications and 
education." 13 The opposition forces cannot, on their own, increase literacy and 
education in the country, but they can- through effective use of the media as a 
political tool- advance the population's understanding of its environment, as 
perceived and defined by the opposition. At the same time, this involves the all-
important process of creating institutions and organizations. 
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From the point of view of institutional theorists, the struggle of the opposition 
has a long way to go. The regime has managed to remain one of the only functioning 
institutions in the country. The military, in effect, is the government. With the 
exception of religious institutions, the military keep a tight grip on every aspect of life 
in the country, including the media. 
Using Huntington's maxim that the degree of government is more important 
that the type of government, one would say there is really one very simple all-
encompassing government structure in the country. 
In Huntington's view, there is an important correlation between improving 
economic conditions and political change, but it is a relationship that in itself does not 
explain the phenomenon. Using that economic gauge, Burma's declining economic 
health, propelled by the efforts of the opposition, would actually run counter to the 
pro-democracy forces' objectives. But Huntington says authoritarian regimes fall for 
a number of other reasons, including a loss of legitimacy, changes in social structures, 
and the actions of external actors. From that point of view, the strategy of the 
opposition does make sense. It actively seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the 
government by pointing to the results of the democratic election won by the National 
League for Democracy. It also works to keep the international community active on 
behalf of its cause. Much of this, again, is done through clever use of the media, and 
against the efforts of the Junta's largely successful work to control the flow of 
information. 
Huntington's argument that the process of modernization engenders instability 
helps explain why the Junta is so determined to forestall modernization, opting 
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instead to emphasize tradition. Instability to the Junta means the very real possibility 
that it will lose power. 
The mirror image can be viewed from the perspective of the opposition. The 
pro-democracy forces are busy developing institutions of their own, not the least of 
which is the media itself. The wide variety of political groups that make up the 
opposition hold regular meetings, make agreements, and work as a developing set of 
bureaucratic institutions. The opposition would like to see change come fast, whereas 
the regime, finding that a certain amount of change is indispensable to its survival, 
works to keep change corning at a gradual pace, in line with Huntington's assertion 
that the faster modernization comes, the greater the chances of instability. 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Theorists 
If, as utilitarian theorists posit, the government seeks its own self-interest, it 
must find a more politically acceptable explanation for its policies if it is to maintain 
social order. In line with Bureaucratic-Authoritarian theory, Alamgir 14 speaks of the 
need for order as the rationale for a strong authoritarian government. Furthering this 
notion, which reflects the arguments made by the SPDC in Burma, O'Donnell and 
Linck 15 say that an underdeveloped setting encourages authoritarianism, which uses 
repression to promote national unification. This description fits Burma, where the 
government cites armed insurgencies from minority ethnic groups as the reason for a 
strong central government. 
Modernization theorists had maintained that democracy comes as a final, 
inevitable result of the process of economic development. Put simply, the wealthier a 
country becomes, the likelier it is to become democratic. But that view was 
16 
challenged by 0 'Donnell who, looking at South America, noted that "the higher and 
the lower levels of modernization are associated with non-democratic political 
systems, while political democracies are found at intermediate levels of 
modernization." 16 From O'Donnell's perspective, the key to political change is found 
within the regime. As he puts it, "there is no transition whose beginning is not the 
consequence- direct or indirect- of important divisions within the authoritarian 
regime itself." 17 Another point made by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead that is 
of critical importance to the Burmese situation is that authoritarian regimes "attempt 
liberalization only when they are already going through some serious crisis." 18 
O'Donnell argued that economic change produced social and political conflict, 
helping to trigger the cracks in the regime that could eventually produce a regime 
change. From this perspective, it is in the interest of the regime to maintain the 
tightest possible control of the media in order to prevent the fissures within the 
regime from gaining momentum and spreading any discontent. Control of the media, 
then, is a way to prevent any crisis from becoming widespread and becoming the 
"serious crisis" mentioned before, which has the potential to topple the regime. 
The views of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian theorists can be seen expressed every 
day in the government-controlled press. When Alamgir says that authoritarian 
governments use the need for order as an explanation for their existence, he could 
have been reading a local newspaper in Rangoon, where the government's argument 
that without its strong hand the country would descend into chaos is routinely made. 19 
Equally visible is O'Donnell's description of authoritarianism as a means to promote 
national unification through coercion. In Burma, a country made up of a large number 
17 
of ethnic groups that have been at war with the central government, the theory fits 
well. 
Theorists such as O'Donnell would look at the Burmese regime and probably 
see a bright future for the opposition. Internal differences among the ruling generals 
have plagued the Junta in recent years. The schism within the regime, they say, is 
crucial to its downfall. As the ultimate retirement of the leading member of the Junta 
approaches, infighting among his possible successors have weakened exposed cracks 
in the system, despite efforts to conceal the disunity. The cracks, as theorists would 
predict, are between hard-liners and soft-liners. (Although in Burma's case a more 
appropriate distinction might be between hard-liners and harder-liners.) 
The regime has utilized its near-total control of the press to create an image of 
solidarity within the military. Conversely, the opposition has gone to great lengths to 
expose the cracks within the ruling elite. 
Democratic Transition Theorists 
Transition theorists look at the process of political change and find other 
factors and dynamics they consider critical. "Modernization," they say, "consists of a 
gradual differentiation and specialization of social structures culminating in a 
separation of the political from other structures, and making democracy possible."20 
On the basis of that view, an authoritarian regime seeking self-preservation, would 
find it necessary to forestall that differentiation. The media, then, would need to 
remain under tight regime control. To prevent the emergence of democracy, the 
regime would keep the media from becoming an independent structure, and from 
promoting other independent structures. 
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Another factor considered critical to regime change, according to transition 
theorists, is the emergence of a credible alternative to the existing regime. This, as we 
will see later, has proven key in the case of Burma. The stability of the regime, in 
Przeworski' s view, stems less from the legitimacy of the existing system of 
domination, than "the presence or absence of a preferable altemative."21 This is a 
view that is widely held among modem theorists, who have stressed that in order for 
regime change to take place, it is not only necessary for the regime to be weak, but 
for a visible alternative to exist. 
There is reason to believe this alternative is preferable to the existing regime, 
given that under the existing regime the country has remained in a state of crisis, the 
economy has contracted, educational and health levels have deteriorated, and a state 
of war has continued with some of the ethnic minorities. 
Przeworski sees the process of democratization as involving two simultaneous 
and largely independent processes. One is the disintegration of the old regime. The 
other is the development of democratic institutions. The media plays a role in 
bringing about or preventing both of these processes, depending on its degree of 
freedom. An open media can stir conflicts within the regime, while helping the 
development of those alternative democratic institutions, of which the media itself is 
one. Democratic transition theorists point to the need for social structures to develop 
as a prerequisite to democracy. They also point to the need for a credible alternative 
to exist as a pivotal requirement for the success of the democratization process. 
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Again, this theory fits well within the Burmese case, where the regime has 
used its might to prevent the development of differentiated social structures, as it 
continues to overwhelm practically every aspect of life in the country. 
On the matter of a credible alternative, democratic transition theory would 
offer a great deal of hope to the opposition. Pro-democracy forces, as they develop a 
number of social structures (including an independent media) have managed to 
provide the people of Burma with a very concrete and credible alternative to the 
existing regime. The leader of the pro-democracy movement is, in fact, better known 
in Burma than practically any other political figure. Her views are well-known, and 
her ideas for the country are clear to the masses. Understandably, the regime has done 
everything within its power to diminish her appeal and to disassemble the National 
League for Democracy as an alternative. Within the country their efforts have met 
with some success, but beyond Burma's borders the opposition remains. 
Democratic transition theorists, looking at the factors they consider critical for 
change, would find good reason for optimism among pro-democracy forces.As for the 
future of the Burma after the end of the military dictatorship, democratic transition 
theorists such as Przeworski would argue that the nature of the authoritarian regime 
has little bearing on the type of regime that will succeed it. In his view, the direction 
of the new government is not predetermined either by the nature of the previous 
regime or the type of transition. Rather, it is set by the choices made by the new 
leaders. 
Democratic transition theorists focus on two separate stages in the process. 
The first is the transition from authoritarian rule, the second is the consolidation stage 
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following that transition. That initial transition phase consists largely of undermining 
the regime. It is the stage where Burma finds itself today. What would come next, and 
may be taking place in Burma, is what O'Donnell describes as a process of 
bargaining between the State and opposition elites. 
In terms of what will come later, O'Donnell would argue that the military 
would have a very minor role in the political life of the country, following the 
transition to democracy. According to him, once the transition occurs, the role of the 
previous regime in the new system is greater if the regime was not very repressive 
and if its economic policies were successful. In the case of Burma, the military, once 
out of power, would have practically no role, since it has been extremely repressive 
and its conduct of the economy has been disastrous. 
Burmese Approaches 
Some Burmese theorists have looked at the situation in their country and 
emphasized cultural and historical aspects that play an important role in the conflict. 
Tin Maung Maung Than 22 observed that "certain traditional institutions and the 
political and religious values they reflect continue to shape the nature of politics." He 
frames the struggle as one deriving from colonial structures, in which differences 
among members of the elite are represented. Importantly, he notes that in Burmese 
culture, anarchy is feared more than tyranny. This point goes a long way in explaining 
why the military regime stresses its ability to prevent anarchy, while the opposition 
claims it too can prevent anarchy without the need for tyranny. 
Another distinguished Burmese academic, Mya Maung 23 has noted the power 
of tradition in Burmese society, highlighting the way in which symbols are 
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manipulated. In his view, the military regime's exploitation of Buddhist symbols and 
Burmese traditions are plainly designed to strengthen its grip on power. 
Other Burmese theorists such as Zaw Oo 24 describe a situation reminiscent of 
Huntington's famed "king's dilemma," saying the regime faces the difficult task of 
strengthening the country's socio-economic foundations through liberalization, while 
seeking to secure a lasting domination of national politics. His views, in some 
respects, reflect those of institutionalist theorists. Development theory helps us frame 
the contest between the military rulers of Burma and the pro-democracy opposition, 
and it explains why information control is key to the success of either side. 
All these theories provide an interesting intellectual framework for observing 
what is happening in Burma, but not one of them thoroughly applies to the country. 
Burma, as it turns out, is a unique case, something that is probably true of every case. 
Arguments among theorists will probably continue, because it is doubtful that 
there will be one theory that neatly explains all situations. Each situation involves an 
unlimited number of factors at play. Many of the factors are found in other places. 
Maybe every one of the factors, separately, can be found at work in other places. But 
the recipe that makes Burma does not exist anywhere but in Burma. No other country 
has an identical history, an identical people, an identical geography and an identical set 
of political actors at play, all combined at the precise moments in history to concoct 
the precise situation we find in Burma. 
What we are looking at, then, is what Tilly calls individualizing comparison. 
As he explains, this does not mean that the theory is useless, irrelevant or 
unnecessary. In his example, "The discovery that today' s poor countries were not 
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recapitulating the economic-growth experiences of Britain, France or the United 
States, contributed mightily to our understanding of social change." 25 
Similarly, we can see in Burma a process that is not the exact replica of events 
detailed in the analysis of development theorists. And yet, we can see interplay of 
many of the factors they describe, as part of their different theoretical models. 
Among the most important of those factors is Huntington's concept that 
modernization produces instability and turmoil. It is the knowledge of that fact that 
motivates the Burmese Junta to step gingerly through the minefield of change, lest it 
lose control of the country in the process. Additionally, and also within the 
framework of institutionalist theory, the fact that the only real institution that 
functions in today's Burma is the military, describes one of the important roadblocks 
along the way to democracy. As stated earlier, the military is the government, and 
there are virtually no other working institutions in the country. In exile, however, 
institutions are proliferating in anticipation of change and as a way of creating 
change. 
From Bureaucratic-Authoritarian theory, it is plain to see the rhetoric of the 
Burmese military, which seems lifted from a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian theory 
textbook. The strong hand of the regime, argue the generals, is indispensable to 
preserve the unity of the country. 
Democratic transition theorists point to an important factor in the Burmese 
struggle when they talk about the importance of the availability of a viable alternative 
to the regime. In Burma, the opposition gained enormous strength when a charismatic 
leader- Aung San Suu Kyi- moved on the scene. In fact, her presence was such a 
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strong factor that it brought about the uprising that precipitated a change in military 
leadership. Her presence, along with that of her party, is clearly an enormous source 
of strength for the pro-democracy forces, and one that is seen as a great threat by the 
regime. 
In terms of the media, Burma also presents a unique case. It is not possible to 
point to another country where the availability of modern communications technology 
has been so sharply curtailed by the authorities, while at the same time being 
wholeheartedly embraced by the opposition. 
The Media and Politics 
Now that we have examined the political theory, it is important to consider the 
other major theme of the thesis, namely, the media. There is an abundance of material 
looking specifically at the role of the media in politics. 
The existing literature dealing with the role of the media in politics surveys a 
wide number of areas. In order to provide context and perspective helpful to the study 
of the role of the media in the Burmese situation, I will look first at the media's 
emerging political importance through history. Next, I will look at what media 
theorists have said about the importance of the media for democracy, followed by the 
role of the media in non-democratic societies as well as in the emergence of 
democracy. Finally, I will explore the existing literature concerning the use of 
technology in the media, with a specific look at how the use of the media and 
technology affected the failed pro-democracy uprising at Tiananmen square, which is 
of specific relevance to the Burmese question. 
History 
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The fact that the media, the flow of information and ideas, has the potential to 
affect political change has not escaped observers. The role of the press in politics was 
identified early in the analysis of political systems- as early as the first known 
democracy. In The Republic, Plato already speaks of the need to control the 
information that is received by the people. By the time of Socrates' trial, 399 BC, 
curtailments on freedom of speech reached such a point that Socrates was sentenced to 
die for the words he spoke. 26 
Clearly, Socrates understood- as do the generals in Rangoon-- that 
information affects behavior and has potential repercussions on a political system. 
Socrates' disciple, Plato, actually advocated censorship as a quality of the perfect state 
in The Republic, prescribing for his ideal state that censors prohibit mothers from 
telling their children tales considered evil. In Laws, Plato recommends that wrong 
beliefs about God be classified as crimes, and that a system be set up to suppress them. 
The codified use of some of Plato's censorship ideas came many centuries later, 
during the Middle Ages. 
In her fascinating look at the role of newspapers in society, Lucy Maynard 
Salmon27 dates the beginning of censorship to the medieval church in its persecution 
of heresy. According to her review of history, the church, after having had absolute 
control of the duplication of manuscripts, promptly assumed control of printing. Pope 
Alexander VI issued a bull in 1501 forbidding any unlicensed printing- the church, of 
course, being the licensing body. This is the type of extreme censorship imposed on 
today' s Burma. 
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The advent of military censorship, which is largely tolerated by democratic 
societies, dates back to 1808. At that time, according to Salmon, the Times of London 
sent Henry Crab Robinson into Spain as what may have been the first ever war 
correspondent. His letters home were published in Britain, prompting the Duke of 
Wellington to complain that he was giving information to the enemy, leading to the 
beginning of censorship in the name of national defense. 28 Salmon's review across a 
variety of nations, eras and political systems leads her to conclude that censorship of 
the press is an unavoidable adjunct of absolute government, and that "freedom of the 
press and absolute government are incompatible." 29 
Still, she finds a glimmer of light even in the darkest recesses of censorship. 
"Wherever and whenever the press has been fettered by victorious authority, where 
freedom of the press does not prevail, where the existing government is opposed, the 
inevitable result has been the appearance of a clandestine press ... "30 This has been 
the case in Burma. 
The counterpart of censorship with arguments that are heard today in 
discussions about Burma also dates many centuries back. In 1644, religion itself was 
used in the defense of freedom of the press. John Milton made the case in his 
Aeropagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of 
England. Milton's theological argument was basically that man should be allowed to 
have the necessary information to choose between good and evil. 
The Media and Democracy 
When pro-democracy demonstrators have identified the free press as a crucial 
element in bringing about and preserving democracy, they are building on a 
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foundation of very old arguments. Milton's 1644 argument was gradually built upon, 
recognizing the importance of a free press in liberal democracy. A few decades after 
Milton, John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government,31 pushed the limits of free 
speech by declaring the extent of man's freedoms and the role of government in 
preserving them. Locke believed in the power of information, something he made 
clear in his defense of separation of church and state in a Letter Concerning 
Toleration when he argued for the need to allow the power of human reason to 
function unimpeded. "It is only light and evidence that can work a change in men's 
opinion." 32 
The view that freedom of speech and its necessary companion, freedom of the 
press, benefit society at large continued to prevail in Western thought. In 1859, John 
Stuart Mill explained why freedom of opinion, the open discussion of ideas, was good 
for society: " ... though the silenced opinion be in error, it may, and very commonly 
does, contain a portion of the truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any 
subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions 
that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied."33 
The idea that individual rights, as the basis of a democratic political structure, 
require freedom of the press, became a tenet of liberal democratic thought. As Kraus 
and Davis put it, "theories of democratic government [advanced during the 18th 
century] held that free access to information and freedom to create and disseminate 
information were important rights of the individual. [These rights] were considered to 
be part of the basic social order." 34 
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The importance of a free press in liberal democracy was highlighted by people 
such as Edmund Burke, who coined the term "The Fourth Estate" to describe the 
press, as a symbolic fourth branch of government. In Burke's conception, the media 
represented a source of protection of the public from the abuses of power, in addition 
to a source of information and knowledge about politics.35 
Not all scholars, however, have placed so much trust in the press. Chomsky, 
for example, has challenged the belief that the media act as a balancing agent against 
abuses of power in democracy. In his view, a number of factors prevent this. 
Concentration of media ownership in a few hands, Chomsky says, thwarts the 
people's access to different ideas. In Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky 
argue that the media, in reality, act as a propaganda machine, protecting their 
economic interests. The great irony of the American experience with freedom of the 
press, Chomsky says, is that the press ends up saying what the government would 
want it to say. "The United States is also unusual if not unique in its lack of restraints 
on freedom of expression. It is also unusual in the range and effectiveness of the 
methods employed to restrain freedom of thought." 36 
Critics also charge that in democratic systems the public tends to trust the 
media and, in effect, let their guard down, accepting information without challenging 
it. This argument was made by some, including Chomsky, in the analysis that followed 
the Gulf War and the intensity of media control by the anti-Iraq coalition. 
With the advent of live television news, yet another reason has been found by 
many who challenge the usefulness of the media in a democracy. The phenomenon has 
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come to be known as the "CNN Effect." The critical view of the CNN Effect 
maintains that by beaming constant images of emotionally charged events directly into 
people's homes, the media emotionalize foreign policy, making it difficult for policy-
makers to take action based on a more reasoned approach. 37 The argument over this 
issue is subject to a number of different interpretations, but its relevance here is 
limited. 
All these challenges to the benefits of a free press in democratic society focus 
largely on the mechanics of freedom of the press, as practiced in modem systems. 
They focus on the impediments to the press becoming an honest player in the polity, 
but they do not generally dispute the desirability of a having a truly free media in 
democracy. The belief remains that a free press is a necessary and important feature of 
democracy. 
In other political systems, the press has operated quite differently, with 
different goals and different organizational structures. Just as the role of the media in 
liberal democracy has been the subject of a great deal of attention, the use of the press 
by the now largely extinct Soviet style systems was also at the center of much 
analysis. These theories help understand the Burmese approach to media control. 
The Media in Communist Systems 
One can view the approach to the media from the perspective of either 
Burma's pro-democracy forces or the government. A useful way for understanding it 
from the regime's view is by looking at the media in communist systems. Albright 
differentiates the role of the media in the two systems quite clearly. "[In democratic 
29 
society] the press provides information and debate to enlighten the public and thereby 
enables citizens to influence and participate in the political system. According to 
communist doctrine, the primary role of the press is quite different. It is not to be an 
adversary of the government, but an advocate. Its role is to serve as an instrument of 
the authorities and to transmit the message of the leaders to the people."38 The way 
the press does this in communist systems, Albright explains, is to become "a 
propagandist, an agitator, and organizer. . .it must educate the masses about 
communism, explain the policies of the party, mobilize the people to build 
communism ... and ferret out enemies of the state." 39 
This role description applies to other authoritarian systems throughout history. 
As Manzanares explains it "from Plato to Machiavelli, the basic principles are readily 
found of the authoritarian system where the press is an instrument at the service of 
those in power." 40 
The degree of control of the communications system reached new levels in the 
Soviet system. It is worth noting, however, an important distinction between the Soviet 
method of press control, which I will describe in a moment, and that of Burma. 
Despite the fact that there was an important body of opposition against Communist 
party rule in the USSR, there was a degree of public support for the system, and belief 
in the legitimacy of the government. In Burma, in contrast, there is every indication 
that the authorities operate with little, if any, public support. The population does not 
consider the regime to be legitimately entitled to rule, and has indicated this when 
given the opportunity. This means that the use of the press as an instrument of political 
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mobilization had a certain amount of support within the USSR, whereas in Burma it 
constitutes another form of repression. 
As we will see, the situation in Burma resembles more that of Eastern 
European countries that came under Soviet domination without popular consent, where 
the systems of censorship operated somewhat differently from those of the USSR. The 
communist authorities in Moscow understood the power of the media and sought to 
bring to its regime the maximum possible benefit from its use. As Kolakowski noted, 
they understood the axiom "the more control of the media, the more power."41 The 
authorities in the USSR worked actively to control every aspect of communications, 
from interpersonal communications to the mass media. Control of the media followed 
the fluctuations of control in other aspects of political life and was tightly designed to 
reinforce the political power structure. The media's role was that of a propaganda 
machine. After each political crisis and each step away from totalitarianism, control of 
the media content would loosen and again tighten in tandem with the political tide, but 
the structure of censorship would never change. For example, when the Stalinist 
period ended and Kruschev came to power, t!lere was a brief period with a limited 
amount of liberalization. During that time, in the mid 1950s, the print media presented 
political debates with a level of openness that had not been seen while Stalin was in 
power. 42 
As in Burma, the use of the media as a political tool was given high priority at 
the top levels of the Soviet government. Censorship and media policy, as Dzirkals 43 
explains, were designed by party leadership in the politburo. He explains how the 
structure of censorship flowed simultaneously down from the top and up from the 
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bottom. Political leaders appointed top censorship and media personnel, and kept close 
tabs on the next level of appointments. At the same time, the system worked so 
effectively that authors became their own censors, knowing exactly what material they 
would be able to publish. 
When there was any doubt about whether or not a particular piece could be 
released to the public, censors followed the chain of command all the way to the top. 
The structure was complex, well financed, and highly sophisticated, with specialized 
agencies focusing on special fields such as the military or science. All of this worked 
in conjunction with a sophisticated system of punishments and rewards. 
The Soviets knew how to use the media and they made sure the Soviet press 
was constantly modernized to better reach audiences. Their objective was not simply 
to muzzle the expression of opposing views, the objective was to mobilize the 
population in support of the existing structure of government. This is an approach that 
is being tried, with limited success, by the Burmese regime. 
As an instrument of policy, the Soviets knew that "the more audiences the 
media effectively reach, the more successfully they carry out their assigned role in the 
system."44 This corollary of information control applied to the Soviet system, just as it 
does to any society, as Albright points out. "In all societies, information is power. 
When a small group can maintain a monopoly on facts, figures, and interpretations and 
decide when and to whom to give them, it is in a position to maintain tight political 
control."45 
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Albright's analysis stems from her examination of the role of the media in 
Poland, but her assessment of the importance of media control is universal. Altheide 
and Snow explain that, " ... all official, unofficial, formal and informal modes of social 
control involve communication formats. The mass media are merely one [example] of 
such control...but they are the most powerful."46 
Under Eastern European communism, press control aimed to replicate the 
Soviet model, but had to make some adjustments. Curry and Dassin argue that "media 
control in Eastern Europe was necessitated by the low level of support for the 
communist takeovers." 47 
But the need for control did not go away once the communist regimes had 
solidified their positions. Once this happened, "they tried to transform their societies," 
she explains. To achieve this transformation, she explains, the media became the 
conduit for instructing and threatening the population, as well as for promising 
improvements. 48 
Curry and Dassin describe the different methods of media control utilized by 
Eastern European nations, whose leaders understood- from the experience of their 
Soviet patrons-- the importance of the press for the survival of their rule. It is quite 
conceivable that the lessons have been studied by the Burmese generals. They have 
clearly been replicated. 
The first method is the initiation mode, in which censorship is designed to 
prevent errors by teaching journalists and artists how to preventively censor 
themselves, a model she says was common in Czechoslovakia. The second method 
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she calls the directive mode, wherein the Party and the government give specific 
instructions to the press through committees and agencies, with no significant 
external prepublication censorship procedure. This was the preferred model in 
Hungary. Thirdly, she speaks of the Political Monitoring mode, where journalistic 
processes and the party and government directions are supplemented with formal 
institutions dedicated to censorship. In this model, the central controlling agency 
seeks to prevent the inadvertent publication of secrets by the media, but also the 
discussion of social problems arising from journalists' contacts with the public. This 
is the model found in Poland. Finally, she describes the so-called Revolutionary 
mode, where censorship, in effect, ceases to exist due to pressures from the 
population at large or disillusionment by censors. This model, she says, emerged at 
different times in different places. Her examples are the temporary flirtations with 
democracy experienced in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 
1980.49 
As the thesis will show, the model found in Burma is more extreme than any 
of those described above, with the media being completely in the grip of the 
government, with formal and informal censorship, supplemented with harsh prison 
sentences for anyone found guilty of reporting unacceptable material. 
The different methods offer evidence of a view espoused by the Marxist 
thinkers Althusser and Balibar, who argued that the means of communication are part 
of the ideological state apparatus. Controlling this apparatus, he said, is an essential 
outcome of any effective struggle to control state power. 5° 
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If control of the media is often essential for state power, it follows that 
changes in media control can lead to political change. That is, in fact, what the 
literature indicates, and a simple reason to explain why the government in Burma is 
reluctant to allow for any changes in control of the press. 
Long before becoming a major player on the international diplomatic scene, 
Madeline Albright examined the role of the media in a rapidly changing Poland. She 
observed the way in which the press responded to and prodded democratic changes in 
Poland during the days when the Solidarity trade union was challenging the rule of 
the Communist party. Conducting a detailed analysis of the way in which Solidarity's 
actions encouraged journalists to challenge the limits of censorship, and journalists, in 
turn, increased the strength of the workers' movement, she asserts that "Poland in 
1980-1981 was a long way from changing its form of government. However, it was 
certainly in the initial stages of an experiment to redistribute power to allow a degree 
of public participation. It is my conclusion that the press was instrumental in the 
embryonic political change." 51 
Technology, Media and Politics 
As later chapters will show, it is plainly evident that the Burmese government 
is obsessed with restricting access to new media technology. The reasons are simple. 
As technological advances have overtaken the traditional media, the role of the press 
in political change has intensified. Where the printing press once moved ideas slowly 
across geographical areas, radio and television moved in, bringing information at 
blazing speeds to populations more numerous than ever before, altering the character 
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of political change. With the advent of satellite television and later the internet, 
geographical boundaries blurred, making it more difficult for authoritarian regimes to 
control information flows to the population. 
In War of the Black Heavens: the battles of western broadcasting in the Cold 
War, Nelson 52 argues that the final fall of the Iron Curtain was brought about less by 
shrewd international diplomacy than by short-wave radio. Nelson focused mostly 
from the BBC, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America (VOA). The process, as 
he describes it, did not escape the attention of Soviet officials who took measures to 
stop the political assault over the airwaves by jamming the signals, stopping 
production of radios and even carrying out assassinations of staff. Nelson describes 
how, jn some cases, the clumsy efforts of bureaucrats resulted in orders not being 
carried out, with radio production continuing despite orders to cease. The 
development of the use of communications technology as a tool of international 
politics began long before the end of the Soviet Union. Abshire relates how the U.S. 
government started short-wave radio transmission during World War II. During the 
height of the cold war the transmissions from Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
started, and by 1976 the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe had seen ownership of radios 
jumped sharply, with about two-thirds capable of receiving the transmissions of 
stations such as the VOA, Deutsche Welle, BBC, Radio Netherland, and others.53 
Just as international transmissions threaten the Burmese regime, these 
transmissions became a challenge to authoritarian governments such as that of the 
Soviet Union. Moscow's control of communications, according to Abshire, was the 
most elaborate ever known. He and other scholars have described the background for 
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such tight controls, which were deeply rooted in Lenin's belief in the power of 
political communication. Short wave transmissions became a point of vulnerability in 
this communications shield, and when television transmission via satellite became 
possible, it was the Soviet Union that in 1972 introduced a draft resolution to the 
United Nations with the intent of making illegal any direct television broadcast 
occurring without the consent of the receiving country.54 It is worth noting that at 
that same time, the U.S.S.R. was broadcasting its own brand of political propaganda 
via short-wave radio to the rest of the world. 
Initially, Soviet authorities made sure that locally produced radios were 
designed in such a way that they could not pick up high frequency bands, the ones 
used by foreign broadcasters. According to Ganley 55the spare parts required to make 
the radios able to receive those foreign frequencies became easily available by the 
1980s. Once satellite television began to dominate news transmissions, the world was 
becoming altogether a different place. The change had been predicted by Van Zyl and 
Tomaselli in 1977, when he declared " .. . the illiterate of the future will not be those 
who cannot read but those who cannot see." 56 
In Burma, outside media sources are largely invisible, as a protection against 
foreign influence. James D' Amato 57 looked at the impact of foreign television 
signals reaching totalitarian regimes during situations of violence. He observed that 
political unrest gives to television the powerful images and ideological messages that 
are easily understood by audiences. He noted that the state experiencing the 
disturbances could find itself, as the result of the transmissions, pressured into 
accommodating the opposition. 
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In discussing specifically direct broadcast satellites and their transmission of 
radio and television signals across international borders, lthiel de Sola Pool 58 relates 
technological change to modernization theories. He explains the hopes that many 
theorists and policy-makers had held for technology in this field, as it would affect 
political, social and economic development. Writing a full ten years before the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and a few years before the advent of international television news 
broadcasts, he detailed the achievements of radio broadcasts such as the VOA and 
Radio Free Europe beamed into the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and maintained that 
the information about world attitudes and trends provided by these broadcasts had 
made possible the evolution and persistence of the dissident movement. The author's 
research indicated that, at that time, one in six people in the Soviet Union listened to 
foreign radio broadcasts on an average day. 
Existing theories of mass communication have only recently started to look at 
the role of the media. When they are re-examined taking this new technology into 
account they will have to adjust for the impact of income differentials, which create 
the potential for a much wider gap in the type of access to information available to the 
wealthy relative to the poor. Despite that gap, however, those who cannot afford to 
own computers will often have limited access through publicly available computers, 
the so-called internet cafes. Once this gap is accounted for, the theories will reflect 
that the internet has a potential impact in some ways resembling that of the printing 
press. That is, it allows many more people to publish their views to large populations. 
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Technology at Tiananmen Square 
Tiananmen Square and the events that made the place famous are one of the 
incidents where the media played a pivotal role in a major political uprising, and 
where, conversely, supression of the media kept that uprising from succeeding. It is 
also a place where the Burmese regime is likely to have learned lessons it is applying 
today in its efforts to remain in power. 
Just as access to foreign media played a crucial role in bringing down the 
Soviet regime and its satellites behind the Iron Curtain, the presence of the 
international press corps, combined with access to foreign broadcasts, proved crucial 
in the Tianamen square uprising. 
The history of China's control of the media is described by Liu Binyan59 
beginning with the advent of communism. Until the late 1970s the party exercised--
with a good deal of success -- total control over the mass media. At that time, because 
of severe economic difficulties, Deng Xiaoping saw the need to bring reform. He gave 
more freedom to the local press, in order to help win support for his reforms. The 
influence of the Western media, however, was and is seen by the party as a threat. The 
article discusses the importance of the media, noting that industrialization had brought 
the ownership of television sets to 130 million units by 1987. It reports that as many as 
eight Western radio stations were heard on short wave by a number somewhere 
between 12 and 60 million Chinese in 1988, with the number doubling in 1989.60 
Altheide and Snow describe the beginning of the uprising in Beijing on May 
13, 1989 two days before the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in China for the first 
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summit between the two nations in 30 years. The students had started a hunger strike. 
As Altheide recounts, when Gorbachev arrived with a massive media entourage, the 
students became eager participants in an international media event. The power of the 
cameras in the development of the movement was tremendous. "In order for the 
Chinese student movement to have the epic proportions it did, it had to become a news 
story." 61 
On May 20 martial law was imposed, and CNN and CBS were ordered to halt 
live satellite transmissions. A few days later, transmissions were again permitted, but 
they were required to go through Chinese government facilities, giving the 
government more control over the material. By June 1, new restrictions almost 
completely ended foreign media coverage. Two days later the troops moved into 
Tiananmen Square killing hundreds, possibly thousands of students. The exact number 
of casualties is not known. That fact alone points to the success of the measures aimed 
at restricting the flow of information. But, as Ganley puts it, by the time restrictions 
were imposed, "the cat was already out of the bag, with her kittens irretrievably 
scattered. 62 
Clearly, the media had opened the bag and done the scattering. Still, the 
restrictions, according to D'Amato, allowed the Chinese leadership to maintain a 
measure of support from the United States government. D'Amato maintains that if 
more coverage had been allowed, the American public would likely have reacted to 
China the way it did to the South African regime, and the U.S. administration would 
not have been able to succeed in its efforts to continue giving China preferential trade 
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status. But that analysis deals with the power of the images from China arriving in the 
West. 
What role did Western broadcasts about China and received in China play in 
the uprising? Curran and Gurevitch not only agree that television turned Tiananmen 
Square into a global stage, but the coverage, they assert, "undoubtedly influenced the 
behavior of the actors ... [it] helped to sustain the demonstration and was probably taken 
into account by the Chinese authorities, perhaps first constraining their response and 
later hastening it." 63 Information contained in a .collection of faxes edited by Stahle 
and Uimonen 64 sheds some more light on the role of high tech communications. The 
two-volume collection contains communications between China and the West where 
the editors say there are some 74 thousand Chinese students and scholars. Many of the 
Chinese abroad helped to send information back to China, directly to those involved in 
the uprising. 
A typical entry relates "Chinese government is going to cut out the 
communication to outside in an hour, according to this morning's CNN news." 65 When 
the Chinese government decided to forcibly end the rebellion, it could have a degree of 
certainty that the masses would not have accurate information about what the 
government was doing or about the precise objective of the students. The suppression 
of the rebellion, then, succeeded. There is every reason to believe the generals in 
Rangoon were paying close attention because of the geographic proximity of the two 
countries and the close relationship between the two governments. 
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Literature on Burma 
Burma sparked the academic imaginations of many interested in studying 
colonialism and the forces that brought it to an end in South Asia. There is an 
abundance of works on the British experience in Burma, replete with personal 
accounts, military analysis, and specific descriptions of the process that brought the 
country out of British domination. As we will see, the literature that is relevant to the 
subject of the media as a political tool is quite limited. Some of it can be found under 
the rubric of human rights. Beyond that, there is some analysis focusing on the impact 
of Burmese culture on politics and, most specifically relevant, an examination of the 
role of the internet in the Burmese conflict. Finally, there is at least one piece looking 
at how the regime uses the media. 
With the exception of that article, there appears to be no work that focuses on 
the media in the conflict pitting pro-democracy activists against the military regime. 
Additionally, there is no systematic analysis of the use of the media by the Junta in its 
control of the country, or by the opposition, in reaching its strategic or tactical goals. 
The Human Rights Angle 
When it comes to the political role of the media in the country, the existing 
scholarly work is quite limited. Much of what is available comes from work focused 
on the issue of human rights, where the lack of a free press is viewed as an integral 
component of military tyranny. Much of that work is more to be viewed as advocacy 
material than scholarly analysis. The very title of some of the books prepares the 
reader. Works such as The Heart Must Break: The Fight for Democracy and Truth in 
Burma 66 help to provide a picture of the situation, along with very personal accounts 
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of the effort to bring information to the people. (Mawdsley's efforts are detailed in 
Chapter 4.) 
The work of human rights groups and journalists organizations offers more detailed 
accounts of repression, and of the conditions under which journalists labor. 
Culture, Power and Politics 
From the academic world, interest in post-colonial Burma by political 
scientists has produced some works. Lucian Pye's Politics, Personality, and Nation 
Building: Burma's Search for Identity offered some insights that are useful today. His 
comments, for instance, on the importance of power in Burmese society foreshadow 
what has become a relentless struggle between two determined sides. ''There are few 
cultures that attach greater importance to power as a value than the Burmese. 
Considerations of power and status so permeate even social relationships that life 
tends to become highly politicized. The fact that Buddhism is a central feature of 
Burmese life makes the quest for power more subtle and more indirect." 67 The way 
in which the government has used the country's religious devotion to further its 
political aims will be discussed later. 
This emphasis on Burmese culture is found in practically every book on the 
Burmese politics. In Josef Silverstein's 1977 work Burma: Military Rule and the 
Politics of Stagnation, the power of tradition is described in a way that has 
consequences for today's pro-democracy movement. "Burma [is divided] between an 
overwhelming majority of tradition-oriented peasants and recent migrants to the city 
and western-educated elite. Burma remains a traditional society- physically isolated 
from the outside world, predominantly agrarian, and strong in its beliefs in religion 
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and man's limited ability to alter his condition." Silverstein was referring to the 
situation decades ago when he said, "the vision of Western-educated elites have been 
at odds with tradition." Even though he does not go into great depth in describing the 
importance of the media, he alludes to it when he explains, "the democratic ideal, the 
socialist goals, and the modem values that informed the rhetoric of the leaders were 
not understood or adopted by those for whom the message was intended. This elite 
made few converts to its ideas because of the poor state of the roads, radio and 
newspapers." 68 It is very difficult to gauge how true this is today. He was referring 
to the failures of the earliest attempts at democracy, but his message, as we will see, 
has not been lost on today' s political actors, who have understood the importance of 
mass communications. 
Writing more than a decade ago, David Steinberg tried to foretell what was in 
the cards for the country. In The Future of Burma- Crisis and Choice in Myanmar, 
he offers some analysis of the efforts made by the military in its new position in 
Burmese politics after the 1988 revolt. His work fits in with some of the development 
theorists' analysis, when he looks at moves by the military, now governing as a Junta, 
to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. He looks at the reform enacted by the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council or SLORC, and at its call for elections, 
which ultimately proved to be a massive blunder along the road to perceived 
legitimacy. After all his analysis, he concludes that it is difficult to prognosticate 
Burma's future. "The Western tendency to think in absolutes, universals, and eternal 
truths may be unsuited to evaluating the Burmese scene. Perhaps one should adopt 
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instead a fundamental Burmese principle, the Buddhist teaching that all is in a state of 
flux. "69 
Steinberg's more recent work on Burma: The State of Myanmar, does address 
media control, when he discusses repression and human rights issues. "The control 
exercised by the state is nowhere more evident than in its subjugation of publishing 
and the media. That the press and television are under state command is evident to 
any visitor." 70 
New Technology 
The new technology in the world of communications is the internet. This new 
phenomenon has actually been studied with specific emphasis on the case of Burma 
by Danitz and Strobel 71 • They believe that this new technology is the ideal tool for 
dissidents, because it is the organizational tool par excellence. It allows groups such 
as the pro-democracy activists exiled and dispersed from Burma to remain in contact 
with each other, creating a virtual community that can work together despite enormous 
distances. It allows for fast action and easy replication of successful efforts and it 
makes it easy to allow participation in the movement for those with different levels of 
commitments. On the other side of the ledger, the internet does present some 
problems. Communications over the internet can be easily monitored and are subject 
to sabotage. 
Whatever the disadvantages, there is one aspect of internet organizing that is 
most suited for the Burmese model, according to their analysis, and this has to do 
with the need to operate in an environment where the leader of the movement may be 
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and is frequently under arrest. They argue the internet as a means of organizing 
resistance through the use of information, "undermines the traditional reliance on 
leadership." The voice of dissidents can be "projected onto the global stage" 
stimulating pressure by other supporters. 72 
The idea that a globalized, internet-driven resistance movement is a panacea 
for pro-democracy advocates is challenged by some. Calabrese argues that the so-
called "nascent global civil society" can have a significant impact, but we should not 
be deluded. He points out that regimes are resorting to violent methods of suppression 
and, in many cases, consolidating power. He concludes that "any utopian view that 
might arise about the means of communication providing a necessary infrastructure 
for a global civil society should be tempered with ambivalence."73 
Media and Political Control 
The article that is most directly related to this work is The Burmese Way to 
Muzzle Dissent by Khin Maung Win.74 Win looks at the absolute political control 
exercised by the military regime. He describes some of the laws that sharply restrict 
the activities of journalists. He concludes that, despite the methods of the military, the 
opposition's determination has led to breaks in the barriers against the free flow of 
information. 
The role of the media in the modernization and democratization process of 
each country could be analyzed individually, but I believe this literature review offers 
a good overview of the main theoretical ideas, along with an examination of a few 
important individual cases. On the basis of this material, I propose to examine the 
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specific circumstances of Burma, and draw conclusions of importance to the study of 
modernization, democratization, and the importance the media in political change. 
Significance to the Discipline 
In examining the different theories of political development it is evident that 
there has not been a lot of work done on the pivotal role that the media can play in the 
process. As each situation is unique, the media may not be critical in all cases, but it is 
in Burma and, undoubtedly, it is in other places. The media are frequently mentioned 
in theoretical analysis, but they are never the overall focus of the work. 
The literature described earlier provides the field with views on three areas of 
scholarly work. The first covers theoretical perspectives on what are the principal 
forces that bring about political development. The second focuses on the media and 
its role in politics, and the third and final area looks at relevant topics found in the 
study of the country of Burma, while not focusing exclusively on media topics. This 
thesis is an examination of the intersection of these three areas, an examination that 
until now has not been carried out. By centering the analysis on Burma, the theories 
of development will be put to a test. The thesis will help answer questions such as 
how well does existing theory apply in a land where economic difficulties and 
tyranny create the tension of political life? What role do the media, with all the 
revolutionary technological advances of the last decade, play in the struggle? How do 
high-technology media juxtaposed on an authoritarian society that has not 
experienced the full force of modernity affect a simmering pro-democracy 
movement? 
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Burma offers a fascinating setting for this analysis. Pro-democracy forces, 
forced to relocate their base of operations outside the country, suddenly find 
themselves in possession of enormous technological resources to promote their cause 
through the media. At the same time, the regime exercises absolute control of a media 
apparatus that is largely confined to old technology. The country's adherence to 
traditional belief systems, coupled with the presence of a wide variety of ethnic 
groups makes it an ideal case to trace the process of a society's transformation from a 
traditional to a modem society, a subject of interest for future research. 
Development theorists, depending on their particular point of view, would 
make various predictions for Burma's future. Modernization theorists might argue 
that before a real transformation takes place, there must be a significant social 
mobilization that would pressure the system for change. Institutionalists would argue 
that the success of the process would depend on the ability of the country to develop 
the political institutions to handle such change and they -Huntington in particular, 
would tell us to expect more strife before the country reaches modernity. 
Democratic transition theorists would look at the all-encompassing role of the 
government and point to the lack of differentiation between political and non-political 
institutions as a major impediment to modernization. On the other hand, they would 
point to the existence of a charismatic alternative to the regime as a promising sign 
for change. Not surprisingly, there are elements in all of these theories that are 
important in the case of Burma. It is possible to see that certain aspects of individual 
theories are not consistent with the Burma experience, if elements of their predicted 
course of events do not reflect the development of the Burmese situation. For 
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instance, when modernization theorists say that a rise in incomes triggers the process 
of modernization, one can see that the struggle for political modernization in Burma 
began with a precipitous drop in incomes. In this case, the theory does not match 
Burmese reality. What none of them focus on is the role of the media. In my view, 
shrewd use of modem communications by the pro-democracy opposition, combined 
with the presence of a highly charismatic leader will allow the opposition to exert the 
necessary pressure to bring about change. Change, however, will come -- as 
Huntington would predict - amid a great deal of strife. 
Methodology 
The methodology for this paper will be based on the comparative method. 
More specifically, it will be what Tilly 75calls an "individualized comparison." As 
discussed earlier, Burma's uniqueness makes direct comparisons with other countries 
of dubious use. Still, the analysis of Burma's case should yield information that can 
be illuminating in examining other countries. That is to say, understanding the 
Burmese case is useful for understanding other countries, but a direct comparison is 
not the best way to approach this analysis. 
The methodology I will use, according to Ragin's conception, can be 
described as comparative, even if there isn't a second country being used explicitly 
for comparison. There is, as Ragin would say, an implicit comparison taking place, 
much as in the case of Tocqueville's work, described by Ragin as a "comparatively 
oriented case study."76 This will be a case study with implied comparisons to other 
regimes. As Ragin points out, "many area specialists are thoroughly comparative, 
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because they implicitly compare their chosen case to their own country or to a 
theoretically decisive ideal-typic case." 77 
The reality is that Burma stands as a unique example of a nation's singular 
culture, history, and political reality. As Tilly explains, there is a great temptation to 
undertake the pursuit of comparison when, in many cases, comparisons may be of 
little value. I believe that pursuing an answer to the question sought by this thesis by 
drawing comparisons with other countries would be misleading. The comparison, 
from Tilly's perspective, is implied in the case study. Factors such as religion, 
colonial experience, ethnic diversity, natural resources, and others, mean that 
comparing Burma to any other country would allow for powerful factors to cloud the 
results in such a way that no statistical analysis could clarify. Instead of a traditional 
comparative analysis, I will pursue a more descriptive, case study approach. The 
principal method will involve examining information gleaned from all possible 
sources, newspapers, internet, and interviews, and looking for indications of how 
each side in this conflict is pursuing its goals through the use of the media, which is 
the question under exaammation. In short, this will be a descriptive analysis of a 
single country. 
The question, for the purpose of methodology, is how valid- or useful- are 
comparisons. There are a few sources such as ITU, which provide useful empirical 
data. But most of the available evidence is qualitative. 
More importantly, a full-scale comparative analysis would be of limited use 
because of the enormous number of factors that would come into play. One of its 
principal shortcomings would be determining which countries should be used for 
50 
comparison. I mentioned Laos (Lao People's Democratic Republic, to cite its official 
name.) If one country had to be chosen, that might be the best candidate. Like Burma, 
it is a Buddhist nation ruled by a military Junta with strong Socialist leanings. But 
Laos has experienced a sharply different history. Just in this century, the country was 
subjected to one of the most intense bombardments in history by the United States, as 
part of the Vietnam War. Laos was a French rather than a British colony, another 
difference with wide-ranging consequences. One might look for countries with 
comparable colonial past or similar economic indicators, places such as Bangladesh 
or Afghanistan. But the power of religious and cultural differences would overwhelm 
the results of any comparison, making it virtually impossible to filter only the impact 
of the media. 
That said, it is unavoidable that comparisons come into play here, as they do 
in practically all other political analysis. "thinking without comparison is 
unthinkable," as noted by Ragin 78 when he quotes Swanson at the outset of his book 
on the comparative method. 
I will rely for my analysis on material that is available through the mass 
media, as well as conversations with exiled Burmese. In addition, my own 
observations, analysis and field notes from Burma taken in August 2000 will play a 
limited role. 
It is worth noting that there is a potential here for a bias in favor of the 
opposition's views due to the fact that they utilize the mass media extensively to get 
their views across. Also, since the only people who are free to speak to the media are 
exiled, this also tends to offer a one-sided view of the situation. Nevertheless, this 
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situation does not preclude this work from including a thorough presentation of the 
government's positions. 
In recent years, the Burmese government has made an effort to counteract the 
opposition by presenting its views to the world. International news organizations 
routinely seek comments and explanation from authorities. Their comments are 
incorporated in the material available for research, along with extensive government 
views offered on a daily basis in the Daily Light of Myanmar, an English-language 
newspaper that mirrors Burmese-language publications. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BURMA 
Introduction - The Power of Tradition 
A look at Burmese history points to the critical role tradition has played 
throughout the country's history, explaining why it has a major role in today's conflict. 
The rulers of Burma have always used myth, symbol and tradition to secure their 
place. That is true today, as the military regime deliberately emphasizes its own ties to 
the country's history, culture, and tradition in an effort to slow the pace of progress, 
and thus maintain its grip on power. At the same time, pro-democracy forces, whose 
objective is to bring political modernization to Burma, also recognize this force. They, 
too, resort to traditional symbolism, even as they push for change. 
To understand today's Burmese conflict it is indispensable to trace the 
historical development of the nation. Burma has strong ties to its past, and many of the 
strategic decisions made by the actors in this drama can be tied to the history and 
traditions of the country. As Mya Maung notes, " ... the present military rulers of 
Burma think and act in terms of the sociopolitical and cultural images of the traditional 
Burmese despotism (paday thayit) .. . "79 The constant reflection of traditional images 
is, to some degree, by design. Military authorities have tried to co-opt local tradition, 
history and mythology to strengthen their grip on power. The media, fully controlled 
by the government, are full of images of generals inaugurating new traditional 
pagodas, attending ancient ceremonies and participating in pilgrimages. One of the 
most visible symbols of the Junta's efforts to emphasize historical links is in the 
renaming of geographical locations to conform to tradition. The most notable of these 
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changes is the name of the country itself, changed by the Junta to Union of Myanmar. 
That is, in fact, what the country has been called in Burmese. Nevertheless, due to the 
political circumstances surrounding the name change, and particularly because the 
government instituting the change is seen by many as illegitimate, the name Myanmar 
was not recognized by many countries and by the opposition. 
At the same time, the opposition, understanding the power of tradition, has 
sought to utilize historical symbols to legitimize its struggle in the eyes of the people. 
Mya80 points to how opposition figures, for example, tend to incorporate the word 
"min" or king in their Noms de Guerre. The word, he explains, signifies traditional 
opposition to the rulers' authority. Other examples from the opposition abound. One of 
the leading pro-democracy groups, the All Burma Students Democratic Front, uses the 
peacock as part of its insignia. The peacock is part of the ancient Burmese Kings 
iconography. In fact, the use of the ancient symbols had already surfaced in the actions 
of nationalist anti-imperialist movements preceding World War II. "The Burmese 
peacock was actually a traditional heraldic device of ancient royalty -like the eagle in 
Germany- but the young nationalists claimed it for their symbol as an oblique 
challenge to colonial authorities." 81 
Similar tactics can be found during periods of political change in other places. 
As Trimberger noted, during Japan's revolutionary civil war in the late 19th century, 
both sides sought legitimacy by embracing the nation's cultural legacy. ''The use of 
traditional political organs and symbols by the rebels produced confusion as to 
whether they were really illegitimate revolutionaries."82 
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Clearly, both sides in today's struggle understand the power of history in the 
present Burmese conflict, as they have in others. Beyond the symbolic, there are some 
very practical political traditions that continue to dominate the country and help 
explain aspects of the current conflict. One of these is the power of centralization, a 
tradition that dates to Burmese history, and dictates the structure of the country today, 
often in defiance of international criticism. ''These attitudes [such as Burma's] 
tendencies toward centralization, its concept of personal power and the consequent 
tendency to factionalism [contribute to] a felt need to create a nation with a shared set 
of goals, rather than simply an internationally recognized state with established 
boundaries." 83 
Today's conflict has its origins with the country's history, beginning with its 
early national development and colonial period, followed by the rise of nationalism 
and leading up to the period of military rule that continues today. 
EARLY HISTORY AND COLONIAL PERIOD 
Early National Development 
The roots of today's Burma or Myanmar can be traced back to the 81h and 9th 
centuries, when the ethnic Bamar conquered the area that is now central Burma.84 
Surrounding that territory were the smaller ethnic groups who are today at the center 
of one of Burma's thorniest questions, the problem of ethnic divisions. These 
divisions between the ethnic Burmese or Bamar and the descendants of the same 
ethnic groups that were there twelve centuries ago, are used by the military as a 
justification for its use of repressive measures to hold the country together, just as 
bureaucratic-authoritarian theorists would predict. They are also a reason why the 
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opposition has worked to create a sellable solution to that problem, building a united 
front of all these groups, and showing it has learned how to deal with that ancient 
problem. Early national development also created the tradition of all-powerful central 
governments, a tradition that to this day plays into the hands of the Junta and is an 
obstacle for the opposition. 
During the gth or 9th century the ethnic Bamar came, moving South from the 
Himalayas, taking over and incorporating the Mon, who had probably entered the 
region from India. The Bamar (transliterated as Burmese by the British) built the 
legendary city of Pagan (now renamed Bagan) on the banks of the river Irawady (now 
renamed Ayeyarwadi). 
The Burmese, ethnically related to the Tibetans, developed a religion that 
combined ancient animism with Buddhism. The religion remains dominant to this 
day, with 89 percent of the population classified as Buddhist.85 
Bagan grew into the center of a large empire, encompassing virtually all of the 
territory in today's Burma. In the 13th century Bagan collapsed when Kubla Khan 
threatened to attack and neighboring tribes rose up. The Buddhist empire left behind 
a spectacular monument to its rule, with thousands of ancient temples standing to this 
day. For centuries after the fall of Bagan, smaller tribes ruled portions of the territory. 
Ethnic groups like the Shan, Mon, and others asserted their independence and 
identity, setting the stage for ethnic disputes that became part of the country's 
lingering struggle. These divisions are at the core of today' s situation, showing a 
strand of bureaucratic-authoritarian theory at work. As Alamgir86 describes in general 
terms, the authoritarian regime uses ethnic divisions to promote its role in preserving 
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order. This fact has not escaped the opposition, which has made great efforts to unify 
the different ethnic groups challenging the authority of the military regime and 
creating a unified national front. This technique would likely meet with the approval 
of theorists like Dankwart Rustow, who stressed the importance of a model where 
"the vast majority of citizens in a democracy to-be ... have no doubt or mental 
reservations as to which political community they belong to."87 
Important centers of power developed in Mandalay, Bago and lnwa. The 
country was reunified in the 161h century in battles that brought defeat to the Siamese, 
today's Thai. That is another conflict whose after-effects can still be felt in today's 
strained relations between Burma and Thailand. 
The absolute power wielded by Burmese monarchs may be a factor in today' s 
totalitarian structure. "By the ancient tradition of divine kingship, the monarch 
wielded unquestioned power over life and death of his subjects." 88 
The Impact of Colonialism 
The country's experience with British colonialism lay the foundation for 
today's use of xenophobia in the military's arsenal. The colonial experience left the 
country with an aversion to and a mistrust of foreigners. That has helped the 
government cast the opposition in a negative light, making the opposition's job more 
difficult: Relying on anti-colonial sentiments, the regime maintains that pro-
democracy forces are merely peons of nations with colonial traits, whose ultimate 
goal is to again exploit the Burmese. 
Border disputes with another neighbor, India, eventually resulted in a 
declaration of war by the British in 1819. The Empire's action came as colonial 
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France, Britain and the Netherlands were competing with one another in their 
conquest of Asia. With France expanding its influence in Southeast Asia, Britain 
viewed Burma as a potential foothold opposite India on the other side of the Bay of 
Bengal. 89 
A series of wars against Burmese rulers ensued, justified by cross-border 
incidents, alleged kidnappings on British subjects, and minor commercial disputes. In 
1852 the British took over the strategic port of Rangoon (now Yangon) and captured 
the southern region of what is now Myanmar, annexing Lower Burma to their 
holdings in India. By 1885, the British had reached Mandalay, the capital of what was 
left of independent Burma. The heart of Burma, indeed the whole of Burma, was now 
part of British India. 
Burma was enormously prosperous because of a wealth of timber and a 
prodigious production of rice. The country's teak forests to this day are a source of 
wealth and controversy, as conservation, survival and exploitation compete to 
determine the fate ofthe forests. 
For the Burmese, British rule brought insult and injury. The Burmese had 
considered themselves more sophisticated than their Indian neighbors. In fact, Burma 
was ahead even of Britain in some areas. Even before the arrival of the British, every 
child went into a monastery at about 7 years of age, receiving a rather complete 
education. The literacy rates in Burma were impressive by any standard, with even 
girls learning to read and write, a fact that the British themselves acknowledged. "The -
census for British Burma in 1872 stated that 'female education was a fact in Burma 
before Oxford was founded"' 90. 
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Incidentally, the U.N. says only 1 in 4 children in modem Burma completes 
primary school. Under British rule, Burma, a proud and sophisticated nation, became 
a province of India. Indian civilians and soldiers, part of the British Raj, poured into 
the country. In a few decades, half the population of Rangoon was Indian, with many 
of the new residents working for the British in enterprises that sent the country's 
wealth out of Burma. 
This legacy has handed the regime a powerful propaganda card to play against 
the opposition, which enjoys a great deal of international support. The regime, 
judging by Huntington's assessment in The Third Wave,91 is right to tackle 
international actions forcefully. 
Huntington's view of what could trigger a transition away from authoritarian 
rule includes the behavior of actors outside the traditional domestic cast of characters. 
Huntington names the potential causes of change coming from " . . . legitimacy 
problems, the effect of economic growth on social structure, changes in religious 
d . h 1· . f I " 92 octnnes, t e po lCies o extema actors . .. 
Under British rule, the smaller ethnic groups were given a great deal of 
autonomy. The majority Burmese, or Bamar, came under direct rule, but other tribes 
retained a great deal of independence. The issue of whether these groups, the Shan, 
Karen, Karenni, Chin, and others. should be part of Burma, governed by a central 
authority, was never officially resolved. Members of those groups have resisted the 
Junta's authority, waging wars of armed resistance, and remaining a crucial part of 
today' s conflict, as can be seen in any account of the conflict. 
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As the movement for independence from colonial power grew in India, it also 
emerged in Burma during the 1920s and 30s. 
THE RISE OF NATIONALISM 
The Emergence of Nationalism and the Name "Aung San" 
The country's battle against colonial power left its mark on the people, 
creating the right climate for today' s regime to appeal to nationalist pride as it resists 
international pressure for democratic change. Again, this has placed another obstacle 
along the opposition's path. On the other hand, nationalism became forever linked to 
the name Aung San. Bogyoke Aung San, the hero of independence, became a beloved 
hero. When the opposition enlisted the support of his daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, 
the Junta found itself facing a daunting challenge. 
Nationalism developed with increasing intensity. The resentment was not only 
against the British, but also against India. Burmese nationalists won an important 
victory in 1937, when the British agreed to separate Burma from India, conceding a 
point of dignity to the nation. Burma became a separate dependency with a limited 
degree of self-government. It was an improvement, but it was hardly enough. The 
coming world war would prove the catalyst. 
It was during the time of the war that a new name gradually came to be known 
throughout the country -- name that remains perhaps the most important in Burmese 
politics. The name is Aung San. Bogyoke Aung San, the father oftoday's democracy 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, would become the father of independence, a national hero 
whose name would become enormously problematic for the regime at the end of the 
20th century. The emergence of a respectable and credible leader, whose name is 
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recognized by everyone in the country, plays a primary role in the outlook for the 
opposition's success, especially in the eyes of theorists like Przeworski, who asserts 
the regime's ability to survive depends on "the presence or absence of a preferable 
altemati ve. "93 
Bogyoke Aung San, who as a student was member of the local communist 
party, had stood out as an activist for independence, joined the Japanese side during 
the war. When Japan invaded the country in 1942, it rewarded Aung San and his 
associates by declaring Burma independent and allowing them to create the Burma 
National Army (BNA). Bogyoke Aung San and his comrade Shu Maung led the 
BNA. Shu Maung, who changed his name to Ne Win, later became the strongman of 
Burma, ruling implacably for decades and holding the country in his control possibly 
to this day. 
The Japanese managed to inspire profound hatred by the Burmese even faster 
than their predecessors had, despite the fact that they had pushed out the British and 
had nominally granted independence. Aung San and the BNA moved to the British 
side and helped the allies win the war in their part of the world. 
After the war, Burma was still under British rule, but before long the British 
and the Burmese developed a process for independence, a process that was 
enormously complicated in large part because of the many nationalities or ethnic 
groups that made up the country. 
The country's ethnic make-up remains much as it was at the end of the 
colonial period in 1948. That is, it remains the subject of sharp disputes and wide-
ranging estimates. More than 100 different ethnic groups have been identified by 
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ethnologists. The government officially recognizes 67 so-called "national races." The 
following breakdown of ethnic groups is probably near the mark: Bamar (Burmese) 
68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Other 9%. 94 
When official talks with the British began, Bogyoke Aung San represented his 
country in the effort to draw a roadmap toward full independence. The plan was to 
convene a constituent assembly of ethnic peoples, including representatives of the hill 
tribes and other regional ethnic groups to determine how to build the new 
independent nation. 
The basis for the new post-colonial Burma was to be the Panglong 
Agreement, signed in 1947 by Aung San and leaders of the Shan, Kachin and Chin 
states. The participants agreed to work together to achieve independence, but to retain 
their right to go their separate ways. The agreement expressed the belief that 
"freedom will be more than speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the 
Chins by their immediate cooperation with the interim Burmese Government. "95 
Under the Panglong agreement, named for the city in Shan State where it was signed, 
the new nation would remain together at the startmg gate of independence. The 
smaller ethnic groups would maintain autonomy within the Burmese federation , with 
an acknowledgement that they had a full right to secede from the Union of Burma a 
decade after independence. But history took quite a different route. 96 
In 1947, elections to choose the constitutional assembly were held. The Anti-
Fascist People's Freedom League, Aung San's party, won 172 seats, three quarters of 
the total, followed by the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) with seven seats. The 
Kayin tribes were given 24 seats, the so-called Anglo-Burman community was given 
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four seats and the remaining 45 went to ethnic tribes of frontier areas. By then, Aung 
San was a hero of major proportions. He forcefully advocated democracy as the only 
road for his country. He called it the only ideology consistent with freedom. But he 
also made some ominous predictions, which tragically for him and for the nation, 
came to pass. 
MILITARY RULE 
Seeds of Repression 
Successful efforts to gain independence were followed by chaos, opening the 
door to a military takeover that continues to this day. Ne Win would take over a few 
years after independence, bringing with him techniques of repression his successors 
still use. He also developed a uniquely Burmese political/economic system he called 
The Burmese Road to Socialism and he introduced bizarre superstition-based rulings. 
His disastrous policies were the impetus for the development of today's pro-
democracy movement. Contrary to what modernization theorists would have 
expected, the pressure for political change came as the result of falling incomes. 
Lipset's classic modernization argument that ''The more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater chances it will sustain democracy" 97 does not appear to hold up in this case. 
Less than two years after he predicted his own demise, Aung San was assassinated by 
a political opponent. Some believe the real perpetrator was his partner in 
independence, Ne Win. Whoever was responsible, the fact was that the era of Ne Win 
was inexorably approaching. 
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The official day of independence came after the assassination, on January 4, 
1948. A member of one of the ethnic minorities, Saw Shwe Thaike, a Shan, became 
the first president and U Nu, a protege of Aung San, became prime minister. 
The new independent nation disintegrated almost as soon as it came into 
being. Ethnic minorities, mistrustful of the majority Bamar, revolted, as did the 
principal religious minority, the Muslims. As if this were not enough, Chiang Kai 
Shek's KMT troops, running from Mao in China, took over a piece of Burmese 
territory in the North. In 1958, U Nu resigned his post, bringing about military rule 
under General Ne Win. Two years later U Nu returned for elections, which he 
managed to win. Those elections were the last the country would see for three 
decades. U Nu formed a new government, but it was not to last. 
A coup by General Ne Win in 1962 ushered in the era of military rule that continues 
to this day. 
After abolishing parliament and naming his "revolutionary council," Ne Win 
announced the country would follow the "Burmese Road to Socialism." It was a road 
that led to poverty, repression and despair. The Revolutionary Council abolished the 
constitution and began running the country through the Burma Socialist Programme 
Party (BSPP.) Soon all political parties would be outlawed, and only the BSPP would 
be allowed to function. 
Officially, Ne Win's rule lasted from 1962 until1988, but many in Burma 
believe he has remained the puppet-master behind the military regimes that succeeded 
him. His rule was marked by a sharp increase in government-fomented xenophobia. 
Ne Win's exploitation of the Burmese people's mistrust of foreigners began what 
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became a hallmark of today' s junta. Because of their experience with colonial 
powers, the people are relatively easily persuaded that foreign nations pursue their 
own interests at the expense of the Burmese. Steinberg describes a decades-old 
campaign against foreigners with Western "long noses" and "black" Indians, which 
point to injustices against the local population and affronts against Burmese "purity." 
98 Those campaigns, dating back to the earliest days of Ne Win's rule, combined with 
Burmese national pride to allow for the cultivation of fertile ground, giving the 
military the ability to taint the opposition because of the international support it 
enjoys. 
Under Ne Win the country was cut off from the rest of the world, with attacks 
on the West's corruption and decadent culture becoming a major feature of 
government propaganda. It is a pattern that remains clearly in evidence. Ne Win's 
rule was also characterized by beliefs in numerology, which took native superstition 
to a place of prominence in the making of sometimes-bizarre policy decisions. 
One of the most peculiar and disruptive moves based on numerology was the 
decision to change the denominations of the local currency, the Kyat, to multiples of 
the number 9, a number favored by Ne Win. Suddenly, the country's currency came 
in notes of K 90 and K 45 . The decision was theoretically propelled by socialist 
efforts to destroy inequality. From one moment to the next, the largest denominations 
were demonetized. 99 That meant that most people's small savings effectively 
vanished. In their place, the new paper money in the odd denominations made 
transactions enormously complicated, as people struggled to count large quantities in 
multiples of 45. 
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But most people did not have large quantities of money. The economy had 
collapsed after virtually every business was nationalized. Ne Win's regime found it 
easy to justify the moves on the basis of Burmese tradition. As Mya Maung explains, 
Burmese monarchs carried official titles that named them "lord kings of existence and 
the owners of everything including the lives of their subjects." The regime maintained 
absolute power, while attempting, or at least claiming to attempt, to create equality 
among its subjects. Maung traces recent military regime practices to this tradition. 
"The tradition of the Burmese king as the ultimate owner of water and land has been 
kept alive by both the civilian government and the consecutive military regimes in 
power since 1962." 100 
Under Ne Win, xenophobic stirrings had also resulted in anti-Chinese and 
anti-Indian riots, spurring mass migrations of productive citizens, contributing to the 
ultimate collapse of the economy and a change in the regime. 
Uprising and Stolen Elections 
As the situation deteriorated, the regime faced what Huntington has called 
"The King's Dilemma." With political pressures building, reform seemed difficult, if 
not impossible to achieve without losing power. Or, as Huntington puts it, "can he 
escape the dilemma of success vs. survival?" 101 
In addition to the economic collapse, a catalyst for the political movement was 
the emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi as a charismatic leader of the opposition. In line 
with the views of democratic transition theorists, the presence of a credible alternative 
to the regime effectively galvanized the opposition, leading to an uprising, a change 
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at the top of the military leadership, and the end of the road to socialism, and the 1990 
elections that produced today' s sharply delineated conflict. 
The situation deteriorated to such a degree that by 1988 a spontaneous 
uprising against the military dictatorship developed. The pivotal date in the uprising, 
not surprisingly, given the power of numerology, was 8-8-88, a date some considered 
auspicious. 102 Demonstrations took on renewed vigor on that date, on rumors that it 
would become the date of Burma's freedom. Instead, it became the date when 
thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators were massacred by government troops. 
In September, a military coup against Ne Win was reported. Many observers 
believe Ne Win himself orchestrated the event. The new military rulers declared 
martial law and constituted the new ruling authority for the country: the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council or SLORC. On the other side of the political spectrum, 
protestors organized the political party that to this day represents much of the 
opposition, the National League for Democracy or NLD. 
Interestingly, the role of students has been central in the current conflict, just as 
during the early days of nationalist agitation the young Bogyoke Aung San began his 
work as a student activist. Students have been instrumental in organizing opposition, 
particularly from exile. Their exile has largely been forced by the authorities, which 
expelled thousands following the 1988 uprising and a subsequent one eight years 
later, when enormous demonstrations erupted on college campuses in Rangoon. Since 
then, the government has kept practically all universities and institution of higher 
education closed. 
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SLORC promised to bring democratic reforms, including elections the 
following year. In a country where symbolism is such a powerful weapon, SLORC 
changed the name of the country to the Union of Myanmar, claiming that the name 
Burma was a legacy of imperial rule. But the new Junta' s promises were met with 
sharp skepticism, as the brutality of their actions against pro-democracy 
demonstrators became known. The opposition refused to recognize the new name 
given to Burma, as did a number of nations around the world, which started to impose 
sanctions, close their embassies, and stop aid to the country. 
Exile 
Following the 1988 uprising and subsequent massacres, as well as the stolen 
1990 elections, a large number of opposition members left the country, creating an 
entire new dynamic in the conflict. Suddenly, the opposition joined the modem 
world, living in Western Europe and Thailand. It gained access to mass 
communications and modem technology, which it incorporated in its struggle. It 
managed to cultivate international support and a legitimate status abroad, including 
the widespread recognition of its leader, increasing pressure on the regime. The 
events of 1988 set the country on a new road, and brought the plight of the Burmese 
people to international attention. An activist exile community began to form and a 
major new actor took center stage as the leader of the pro-democracy forces. Almost 
by accident, the daughter of Burma's independence hero became an international 
figure with a following within the country to rival only that of the Buddha himself. 
Aung San Suu Kyi had left the country many years earlier and was living in 
Oxford, England with her British husband. At the time of the uprising, she happened 
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to be in Rangoon visiting her ailing mother. When the situation began to deteriorate 
she was basically drafted into the opposition. She proved a powerful symbol and a 
charismatic figure, partly because of the magnetism of her legendary father's name, 
partly because of her own talents. The very articulate Suu Kyi became the official 
spokesperson for the pro-democracy forces. Her worldly demeanor, including fluency 
in many languages, immediately raised the profile of the struggle around the globe. 
As leader of the Junta's adversaries, she quickly found herself under house arrest. The 
detention did nothing to diminish her influence. 103 
The promised date for elections passed, with the SLORC generals continuing 
to vow they would usher in democracy. As they laid the groundwork, the Junta did 
make some dramatic changes. The Union of Myanmar abandoned the road to 
Socialism, announcing the country was now capitalist. Most major industries, 
nevertheless, remained in the hands of the government. 104 Still, moves that might 
have brought popularity to the new leaders were overwhelmed by actions that brought 
enormous suffering to the population. Entire villages were relocated by the military 
(known as the Tatmadaw) with virtually no notice, a practice that has continued to 
this day, part of an effort to keep the population off-balance. Forced labor and 
exploitation of villagers by soldiers continued to be commonplace throughout the 
country. At the same time, opposition leaders like Suu Kyi- who had been appointed 
secretary general of the NLD --were openly persecuted, vilified in the press, 
imprisoned and regularly tortured. 
The Junta had probably misjudged popular reaction to its policies when it 
decided to allow elections in 1990. In May of that year the Burmese people went to 
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the polls in the first free election in three decades. The government was flabbergasted 
by the results. NLD candidates won more than 80 percent of the parliamentary seats 
in play. The military wasted no time in preventing those elected from being sworn to 
their new positions. A wave of arrests buffeted the NLD leadership, and the election 
was invalidated. Since the 1990 election, scores of NLD leaders who emerged as 
winners at the polls have been jailed, exiled or killed. 
Following the 1990 election, the opposition set up an important base of 
operations in Thailand, as work within Burma became increasingly difficult. The 
SLORC intensified its media attacks on Suu Kyi and the NLD, centering much of 
their attacks on her links to foreigners and the influence of foreigners on the entire 
movement. At the same time, opposition leaders focused a great deal of their efforts 
on garnering the power of international opinion, while trying to maintain support and 
credibility within the country. With some of the strictest regulations on travel of any 
country, Burmese authorities were quite successful in keeping foreign journalists 
away and thus severely curtailing coverage of conditions, both political and 
economic, within the country. Burma receded from the headlines. 
A major boost to the opposition came in 1991, when Aung San Suu Kyi was 
awarded the Noble Peace Prize. That distinction made her writings and the work of 
her supporters gain recognition, but more than a decade later, Suu Kyi remains under 
house arrest and the generals remain in absolute control of the country. 
The Military Under Siege 
The new period saw the successful utilization of mass media by the 
opposition, resulting in intense economic pressures on the regime. The regime also 
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opted to seek international help, gaining a seat in the regional ASEAN group. As 
economic pressure mounted, political repression increased, while at the same time a 
measure of economic liberalization appeared in a collapsing economy. 
In 1997 the SLORC leaders, mindful of the price the economy was paying as 
a result of international sanctions, began making efforts to obtain legitimacy around 
the world. One of the more interesting moves they made toward that end was 
renaming the Junta, as advised by Madison Avenue public relations consultants. The 
generals christened themselves a kindler, gentler-sounding SPDC - State Peace and 
Development Council - trading Law and Order for Peace and Development. 
Since then, their standing has improved in some areas and deteriorated in 
others. Their neighbors have included them in the regional Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN.) The United States banned new investment and aid, and the 
European Union imposed a ban on the issuing of visas to military and government 
officials and their families. Investment from neighboring countries, particularly 
Singapore, increased significantly, while Western companies faced strong pressure 
from the opposition and their supporters urging them to keep their money out of the 
country. 
The most significant military support has consistently come from neighboring 
China, whose assistance has allowed the Tatmadaw, Burma's military, to double in 
size since the current Junta came to power in 1988. During that time, despite strong 
condemnation of the military and constant accolades of the pro-democracy forces, the 
reality, in my view, is that the NLD's influence has significantly eroded as its offices 
have been closed, its leaders jailed, and political activities frozen . 
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At this time, the most powerful weapon at the hands of the opposition appears 
to be the leveraging of international public opinion. The military, in the meantime, 
has strengthened its grip. Several of the armed insurgencies by minority ethnic groups 
have been quashed, and victories in the battlefield by the opposition are rare. As for 
the people of Burma, conditions have steadily deteriorated. The government is judged 
one of the most autocratic in the world by ~uman rights and international 
organizations. Freedom of the press is non-existent, as is any freedom of expression 
or assembly. Possession of an unlicensed fax machine can be and routinely is 
punished by imprisonment. Direct communication with the world outside of Burma is 
virtually impossible and contacts with foreigners are, with some exceptions, against 
the law. 
Economic statistics about the country vary widely. The IMF statistical report 
on Myanmar 105 points out in the footnotes that the source for the data is the 
Myanmar Government, a source not considered the most reliable by many observers. 
Given the restrictions on access, it is difficult to obtain truly independent information. 
Statistics also confront the dilemma of what exchange rate to use. The official rate is 
about K6 per US dollar, while the black market rate reached about K800/dollar at the 
end of 2001. Per capita GDP is estimated, depending on exchange rates and other 
factors at a high about US$1400, adjusted for purchasing power parity 106 to a low of 
$11, the figure one would obtain using black market rates. 
The country spends twice as much on weapons as it does on education and 
health care combined. 107 It is generally believed to be the second poorest country in 
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Asia behind Afghanistan 108 and is considered one of the poorest nations outside of 
Africa. 
A Hint of Transition 
Democratic transition theorists have identified a stage in the process of 
modernization during which bargaining takes place between the elites of the opposing 
sides of the conflict. It is possible that Burma has entered that phase. 
In Burma, signs of a potential change of the situation have emerged, as 
economic pressures have become extreme, with the military experiencing trouble 
paying soldiers. The government appears to respond to international pressures on 
human rights grounds, particularly criticism of its forced labor practices, which 
potentially could put an end to all foreign investment. Secret talks with Suu Kyi 
began, but it is unclear whether they are the type regarded as bargaining between 
regime and opposition elites described by democratic transition theorists. At the same 
time, evidence of differences between factions in the Junta point to what could be the 
emergence of the type of schism that bureaucratic-authoritarian theorists believe 
could be the beginning of the end of military rule. 
With the treasury depleted and economic conditions deteriorating, the 
government is trying to attract some foreign investment. Unexpectedly, the issue of 
forced labor has proven pivotal in recent years. The International Labor Organization, 
an entity of the United Nations, has seized on the military's widespread use of slave 
labor to pursue punishing sanctions. As authorities vow to do away with the sharply 
condemned practice, neighboring countries like Singapore and Malaysia have sought 
to intercede in the search for a political solution. 
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In late 2000, the government announced that talks were underway between the 
NLD and the government to reach a solution to the country's enduring political 
impasse. The talks, nonetheless, were declared off-limits to the press, and reportedly 
both sides agreed to keep details out of the public arena. Since the talks began, the 
government has released a number of NLD prisoners as a gesture of goodwill. But 
some have grown increasingly pessimistic of talks that have so far yielded no 
concrete formula for a solution, particularly as the leader of the NLD remains under 
house arrest. 
Also worth noting is the impending change at the top of the Junta's leadership. 
Because of the secretive nature of the regime, it is impossible to know exactly what is 
happening as the generals jockey for position. It does seem clear, however, that 
factions within the regime have aligned themselves behind the potential successors. 
This emerging development could be the beginning of the end of the regime, if one is 
to believe the views of transition theorists like Przeworkski who, " .. .like 0 'Donnell 
and Schmitter, highlights the importance of splits within the regime as a factor 
accounting for the initiation of the transition." 109 
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CHAPTER 4: THE REGIME'S TECHNIQUES OF CONTROL 
AND THE MEDIA 
Introduction: The Importance of the Media 
Authoritarian regimes seeking to hold on to power generally find it necessary 
to exercise control of the media. As Pye 110points out, political modernization requires 
learning. It involves accepting new ideas. This is a process that, if it is to be stopped, 
demands placing restrictions on the media. More plainly, "the process of 
modernization is, very largely, the process of acquiring new images." 111 As we will 
see, the process of avoiding modernization, to the Burmese junta, requires 
maintaining and shining a bright spotlight on old images. 
The potential power of the media as a factor in modernizing is enormous in 
places like Burma. Pye notes that, " .. .in societies not saturated by the mass media 
these forms of communications may have a greater influence on conscious, cognitive 
learning about politics than they appear to have in advanced societies." 112 
The Burmese Junta exercises near complete control of the flow of information 
within the country. The extent of its efforts to achieve such control is an indication of 
how crucial the regime believes information control is for its survival. On this point, 
the government's views are well aligned with those of modernization theorists in the 
sense that in the modernization process -- with its political pull towards democracy --
there is a crucial role for communications. Hence, if the military authorities want to 
forestall democratic change, they must keep a tight grip on the media. 
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The SPDC's strategy is to suppress virtually all forms of information, unless 
they originate with the regime. As it blocks other views, the regime produces its own 
version of events, promoting the official "truth." In the West, some of what passes for 
news and information in Burma would be viewed as patently false. To a large degree 
that is also true in Burma, but authorities there are trying to appeal to a level of 
tolerance for ruler-inspired versions of the truth that is more commonly found in 
traditional societies. In Pool's view, ''Traditional societies are more concerned with 
the social function of communication than with its truth-value." 1130r, more to the 
point, "A statement is valid in a traditional society if it comes from the right oracle." 
11~his acceptance of non-truths, nonetheless, is quickly eroding in Burma, as the 
people view their rulers as illegitimate, and increasingly dismiss the information they 
receive from the government press. 
Most of the efforts at media management are directed at information control 
within the country. Still, Burmese authorities do not completely ignore the outside 
world. The regime, especially in recent years, has tried to "spin" its image abroad, 
using a limited version of its domestic tactics for international consumption. 
The Regime's Techniques of Control 
The government' s use of the media as a political tool can be broken down into 
six specific techniques: Suppression of local media, dissemination of propaganda, 
ownership of media outlets, censorship of independent outlets, blockage of access to 
technology and, finally, restrictions of access to outsiders. All of these techniques 
overlap and work to reinforce one another, but in order to examine the government's 
actions it is necessary to take them separately, even at the risk of oversimplifying. 
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Interestingly, these techniques present a rough mirror image of what Pool says 
are the decision developing nations face with regard to their mass media. In his view, 
modernizing societies must decide "what roles to assign the public and private sectors 
respectively ... How much freedom to allow or how much control to impose [and] how 
much control to impose." 115 The techniques used by the Burmese generals reflect the 
choices they have made in making those decisions. 
Suppression of Local Media 
The authorities ensure that theirs is the only version of reality available to the 
population. This allows them to present themselves as the only legitimate alternative 
and, conversely, helps to delegitimize what democratic transition theorists views as 
one of the most important requirements for political change, namely the availability 
of a credible alternative. 
This technique is first on the list for a reason: it is the most blunt and brutal of 
the methods of media control. The Burmese Junta routinely jails and tortures 
individuals engaged in the field of journalism, earning for the country the dubious 
distinction of holding the record for the greatest number of journalists in prison in the 
year 2000. 116 Human rights organizations have repeatedly condemned the abuses of 
the Junta or SPDC, as they narrate in gruesome detail the mistreatment of members of 
the media. According to Amnesty International, torture is an institution in Burma, an 
institution that has focused a great deal of its attention on journalists. 117 
The RSF annual report 118 tallies the numbers of journalists killed and 
imprisoned during the previous year in the country while earlier mission summaries 
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describe the circumstances and actions that appeared to have brought about the 
detentions. 
The legal maneuvers are carefully cloaked in legalisms, with detained 
journalists generally taken through the legal system, accused of very specific crimes 
in violation of specific laws. The regime thus clings to a claim of legitimacy, even in 
the very acts that delegitimize it in the eyes of its people and the outside world. 
Clearly, the Junta views censorship as something that must be done within certain 
political parameters in order to avoid stoking the opposition ' s claim to legitimacy. 
For example, writer Kyi Tin Oo was arrested in March 1994. His case was 
heard by a special court in the famous Insein prison. He was tried on the basis of 
articles 5U) of the law for the protection of the State and 17(1) of the law concerning 
illegal association. He was accused of publishing articles in banned magazines. 119 
Incidentally, Kyi Tin Oo' s 1994 sentence was not his first. His case, which is by no 
means unique, dates back to the earliest days of military dictatorship under Ne Win. 
He was in jail in the 1960s, 1970s and after the 1988 uprising, with a total of some 20 
years in Burmese prisons. 
Many of the journalists in prison are among those who were elected to 
Parliament in 1990 and never allowed to take their positions. Among them is Sein Hla 
Oo, who stands accused of distributing his writings to foreign embassies.120 
This pattern of targeting individuals who have been anointed with popular 
support through their success in the ballot box is consistent with an effort to 
undermine the viability of the opposition as a credible alternative, something 
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democratic transition theorists point to as a prerequisite for the democratization 
process to move forward. 
Conditions in the prisons are dismal, a fact that is well-known and acts as a 
deterrent to all but the most daring. Even when deterrence is effective, work within 
the government-sanctioned spheres of journalism can have unexpectedly devastating 
consequences. Photographer Thar Win, perhaps accidentally, allowed a caption to one 
of his photos to offend a Junta member. The general had him arrested. He died as a 
result of being tortured in prison. 121 Thar Win's experience may be a manifestation of 
the emerging schism within the ruling regime. The sharp reaction to what might seem 
a trivial matter could indicate this is a period when jockeying for position makes the 
generals' images crucial to their survival, even though there is a clear hierarchy 
within the Junta. In the view of development theorists who believe breaks within the 
regime mark the beginning of its end, this could indicate that the survival of the 
authoritarian regime as a whole may also be in play. 
Many of the detainees at the Insein prison are housed in dog kennels where 
they sleep on concrete floors, receive no visits and no have no access to health care. 
Women prisoners sleep on bamboo mats on the ground. "From 6 a.m. every day, the 
women are forced to sit on the ground with their legs crossed and heads bowed. 
Speaking is punished. Once a day they are taken to the 'showers' where they have the 
right to talk, for 15 minutes." 122 
These conditions are well documented by most major human rights 
organizations. "Recent eye-witness accounts have confirmed reports of beatings, 
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electrocution, sleep deprivation ... hanging by the hands and feet, all of which are 
apparently commonplace in Burmese prisons." 123 
However brave and defiant some journalists may be, there is no question that 
jailing and torturing members of the media who do not toe the line has drastically 
limited the amount of independent information available to the local population and 
to the rest of the world and has helped the SPDC keeps its grip on the country. It has 
made it much more difficult for the opposition to present its views and promote its 
image as a viable and legitimate alternative to an authoritarian regime. 
Dissemination of Propaganda 
The government's propaganda efforts center around a number of themes, all 
of which strengthen their hold on power and can be viewed as part of their effort to 
prevent modernization and perpetuate the traditional society in which they are able to 
maintain power. 
One of the most important characteristics of government propaganda is the 
effort to foment xenophobia in the local population. Typical of those efforts are 
articles claiming that foreigners view the Burmese as inferior, with statements like 
"the BBC and Voice of America have of late been continuously broadcasting 
fabricated news and articles, taking the Myanmar people to be snotty children and 
nincompoops." 124 
Xenophobia is useful to the regime's goals because it helps undermine foreign 
condemnation, and it strengthens the argument that pro-democracy activists, who are 
supported by foreigners, are not interested in the well being of the Burmese people. 
This technique is consistent with what modernization theorists (see Alamgir, 1997, 
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Huntington, 1968) would predict in an authoritarian regime, which can be expected to 
emphasize traditional values and traditional culture. It is also consistent with attempts 
to undermine the image of the opposition as a credible alternative to the Junta. 
Crossing the line from this emphasis into an anti-foreigner sentiment requires just a 
short walk. 
Among the most striking displays of propaganda is the use of billboards 
proclaiming the "People's Desire." The chillingly Orwellian messages can be found 
throughout the country, and they encapsulate the xenophobic thrust of the Junta's 
efforts to maintain its grip on power. The signs, plain to see for any visitor (as it was 
to me) read as follows: 
People's Desire 
-Oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding negative 
vtews. 
-Oppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress of the nation. 
-Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State. 
-Crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy. 
As Nancy Hudson-Rodd explains, the generals have taken on the task of 
defining not only the "People's Desire" but also the overarching theme of national 
identity, subverting the country's ethnic and historic facts, in the way that is most 
advantageous to their own rule. "At the highest State levels," she says, "there is a 
concerted effort to build a national identity that reflects the military regime's values 
and aspirations of a unified national state. This unified vision denies the multi-
cultural reality of historical and contemporary Burma. The military regime have used 
and continues to impose their vision of cultural heritage ... " 125 
Perhaps no attempt at promoting xenophobia is more transparent in its 
objectives and its technique than the attacks on the leader of the opposition, Aung San 
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Suu Kyi. Because Suu Kyi lived overseas and was married to a foreigner, the regime 
.. 
believes this is an ideal method to undermine her credibility. Suu Kyi is described 
using a seemingly endless barrage of nicknames, in an effort to avoid using her real 
name, which is revered by her followers, and made even more difficult to attack 
because it carries her father's name, and her father is officially the national hero of 
independence. ''The foreigner's wife" is perhaps the kindest of the terms used in 
articles that avoid her name altogether. 126 Other names going outside the xenophobic 
theme include crude sexual insults, but more commonly the monikers carry political 
connotations like the "Democracy stunt princess," and the "Power crazy" woman. 127 
The government is scoring military successes against ethnic minorities in the 
field. The results of its propaganda efforts, on the other hand, appear to be less 
fruitful. "Attempts to scapegoat Aung San Suu Kyi have been unsuccessful. She is 
officially blamed for a continuing clutch of ethnic insurgencies in the north and east 
of Burma. Most observers believe, however, that it is a lack of democracy that has 
made a stable peace so difficult to achieve." 128 
Beyond being accused of siding with colonial interests, Suu Kyi has been 
regularly demonized in the government-controlled press. Common names used to 
refer to her include "Ogress," "stooge of the West," "demon with fangs," and "tarnish 
of her own race." 129 Reaction from Suu Kyi and her followers has ranged from 
amusement to puzzlement and rage. Some of the epithets are truly bizarre ("axe 
handle") but most are truly offensive. She says, "the whole attitude is so patently 
crude and vindictive that the public, the majority of the people, just can't abide 
this." 130 
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The matter of Suu Kyi's name is something of a minefield for the authorities 
because of her father's position. It is traditional to review Bogyoke Aung San's life 
on the anniversary of his assassination. On his anniversary in 1999, for example, the 
regime opted to forego the usual praise of the anti-colonialleader, instead launching 
into an attack against his daughter, the pro-democracy leader. The local newspapers 
carried articles explaining that the people "loathe" Suu Kyi and consider her a traitor, 
and urging the NLD to drive her out of politics. 131 
Xenophobic attacks on Suu Kyi seem to ebb and flow with the political tides. 
In mid-1996, for instance, when the military tried to orchestrate pro-government 
rallies in response to the enormous crowds coming to hear Suu Kyi speak from her 
home-- where she remained under house arrest-- the attacks visibly intensified. The 
local English language newspaper explained that she was "ignoring the national well-
being and dancing to the tune of the colonialists." 132 While a Burmese language 
paper called her "the daughter-in-law of the white face . .. a popular public figure very 
useful in the scheme to indirectly enslave the country." 133 
When the SPDC, under intense international pressure, claimed to be working 
towards reconciliation with the NLD starting in late 2000, the attacks subsided 
noticeably. 
Attacks on the opposition are not limited to Suu Kyi. Her entire organization, 
the National League for Democracy (NLD) is also the target of government diatribes 
that attempt to cast the organization as a foreign-dominated entity bent on once again 
placing the country under the yoke of colonial powers. A typical installment came in 
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the newspaper Myanmar Ahlin, which said that "internal traitors" were collaborating 
with a new breed of colonizers to destabilize the country." 134 
Other descriptions of the NLD include "traitors," "snakes," "Satans of 
destruction." 135 Newspaper and magazine articles attacking the NLD offer an 
almost-daily diet of attacks on the organization, served with sidebars describing how 
NLD members find the error of their ways and sign "letters of resignation" from the 
organization. The reality is that NLD members live under intense pressure from the 
military and many do leave the organization, either in frustration for their inability to 
change the system, or in fear for their lives. Government propaganda also paints anti-
government activists among ethnic minorities as enemies of the Burmese people, 
seeking to create mistrust among the different ethnic groups that fall under the 
SPDC's rule. As one Burma observer described it "there is an underlying 
prejudice ... against Christians and ethnic minority groups such as Karen or Kachin, 
whom they still identity -- sometimes in the state-controlled media- as supporting the 
British under colonial rule." 136 The Muslim minorities are also vilified, especially as 
the regime tries to cloak itself in Buddhist tradition. 137 Television newscasts and 
newspapers invariably carry images of generals in uniform attending religious 
ceremonies, unveiling new Buddha statues, and receiving the blessing of Buddhist 
monks. "Nearly every day, a top general travels by armed motorcade to a recently 
restored pagoda. As state television records his piety, the general removes his shoes 
and inspects a newly gilded Buddha." 138 
In a very religious society, this is also an effort to legitimize their rule and tie 
themselves to the country's traditions, in sharp contrast with the "godless" ways of 
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foreigners with purported colonial aspirations and anti-government students with 
modem views that might move them away from the more traditional ways of the 
country. 
Ownership of Media Outlets 
This technique is as simple as its name indicates. The government, plainly, 
owns virtually all the major means of communication in the country. And those which 
it does not own, it controls very carefully. The reason is simple. "The free flow of 
information is obviously seen by the military junta as a threat to its already tenuous 
grip on the nation's citizenry, not a vital lubricant of educational and economic 
progress." 139 Given this, what more effective way to control content than by owning 
the media outlets and thus having absolute control. By doing this, the government 
prevents the flow of ideas described by modernization theorists like Deutsch, who 
viewed the acquisition of information and new ideas occurring in a modernizing 
society as creating pressure for change on the regime. 
The government owns and completely controls both national television 
channels and all the daily newspapers. 140 There are a number of privately run 
magazines, whose stated focus tends to be poetry, short fiction , history, etc. 
In the year 2000, the government authorized the printing of the first privately 
owned newspaper, the Myanmar Times, a joint venture between a local firm and an 
Australian businessman. The publication, nonetheless, proved to be little different 
from what the government offers, "merely presenting government propaganda more 
professionally than the clumsy official press." 141 Public access to information and 
news offered by local media is minimal. The only way for the population to truly 
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know what is happening in the world is by listening to short-wave radio broadcasts, 
which is illegal and punishable by imprisonment. The government-owned media 
provide a virtually useless series of news items devoted mostly to propaganda. Some 
of the articles are written in such a way as to communicate almost nothing, producing 
material that in some places might pass for comedy. Here's a sample, which is best 
savored aloud, from the newspaper New Light of Myanmar. 
National Convention Convening Commission 
Meets 142 
YANGON, 31 July-National Convention 
Convening Commission held its meeting at the 
meeting hall of the Commission this afternoon. 
Present were Chairman of National Convention 
Convening Commission Maj-Gen Saw Lwin 
and Vice-Chairman Maj-Gen Sein Htwa and 
members of the Commission. National 
Convention Convening Work Committee and 
National Convention Convening Management 
Committee 
reported on matters relating to the National 
Convention. Members of the Commission took 
part in the discussions. Chairman of the 
Commission also took part in the discussions 
and the meeting ended with the concluding 
remarks by the Chairman. 
Censorship of Independent Outlets 
The work of the extremely limited number of independent media outlets is subjected 
to strict censorship, at times reflecting the developing cracks in the government's 
leadership. This technique represents an extension of the regime's efforts to portray 
itself as the legitimate heir to national tradition, as well as its efforts to deligitimize 
the opposition, all elements found in theoretical models of political change. 
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Many of the independently owned publications, while not officially property 
of the government, in fact belong to top officials and their friends. Not all do, 
however, and they are the focus of extremely intense scrutiny and relentless 
censorship. But censorship is not limited to so-called independent publication. All 
articles, including those written in the government press, have to be submitted to 
censors and cleared by authorities prior to publication. 143 
The Burmese army has enjoyed, since the earliest days of military rule, a 
number of laws that allow it to curtail freedom of speech. In 1962 press laws were 
enacted under Ne Win, and the laws have been regularly updated to keep up with 
technological change, including electronic journalism. Crimes like "publishing 
information harmful to the State" and "fomenting disorder" are harshly punished. But 
before there is any punishment, journalists have to get their work through the censors. 
Some of the censors' work goes to fascinating extremes. When the national football 
team lost an important match to Indonesia in November, 2000, editors were warned by 
censors about the dangers of reporting the story in an "inappropriate way." 
144Journalists took the safest approach to the quandary, choosing not to report on the 
game at all. Not to divulge the results of the match, at first blush, might seem 
unrelated to politics. The members of the national football team, however, had been 
personally chosen by General Khin Nyunt, one of the highest-ranking members of the 
SPDC and the leader of one of the factions in the Tatmadaw, thus the losing score was 
viewed as potentially harmful to authorities in a system where either the general felt 
insecure, the censor was scared of the general, or both. 
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In 2000, authorities also banned from the country any magazines, newspapers 
or recordings containing the name of Aung San Suu Kyi, with jail penalties of 3 to 20 
years for offenders. 145 
On the whole, the available news focuses on attacks against the West and the 
opposition and on upbeat accounts of conditions in the country. The major challenges 
faced by Burma are never mentioned. News about AIDS (an enormous problem in 
Burma), drug use, economic conditions, and other serious internal problems are 
seldom reported. 146 Government-sanctioned broadcasts and printed news enjoy no 
credibility with the public, and the government is well aware of that. Brig Gen Zaw 
Tun, deputy minister for national planning, reportedly told an economic conference 
that "the fact is that people tum off the TV when the news is shown . . . [and] only after 
the news hour they switch the TV on again to view Chinese movies." The general lost 
his job shortly after telling his audience what they already knew.147 When confronted 
with accusations of excessive controls of the flow of information, the SPDC explains 
it is all a requirement of stability for a threatened nation. 148 
Blockage of Access to Technology 
The area of mass communications technology is one where the uniqueness of 
Burma's situation is most evident. The recent advances have challenged the ability of 
the authorities to choreograph the reality that is presented to their people as part of 
their campaign to slow the pace of change and retain power. 
Of all the areas controlled by the government, perhaps none is as constricted 
as the flow of electronic communications. This means that sending or receiving 
information to and from the outside world is particularly challenging. In Burma it is 
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illegal to own a modem without a license. It is illegal to use the Internet and it is 
illegal to send or receive emails without special permission. To make 
communications with outsiders a little more difficult, it is also illegal to invite a 
foreigner into one's home. 149 In a world where communications are crucial for all 
forms of trade and economic activity, the International Telecommunications Union 150 
reports that Burma has 0.56 telephones per 100 inhabitants, or roughly 1 telephone 
for every thousand people. That compares to an average in Asia of 9.57, almost 20 
times higher. ITU reports Burma has 0.11 personal computers per 100 inhabitants, 
compared to 2.95 for Asia, almost 30 times higher. The number of Internet users, 
according to the report, is some 7000, or 1.47 per 10,000 people. That compares to 
329.89 or more than 224 times higher for Asia. These figures are self-reported, and 
quite possibly higher than reality. A visitor to the country can plainly see there is 
virtually no access to the Internet, except for a handful of top government officials 
and a very small number of businesses. 
The general population can make requests to send individual emails, which 
are handed to government officials who decide whether or not they are suitable to be 
sent and then type them into the computer and receive the responses. The threat of 
email and the Internet has grown in recent years because exiled dissidents have 
proved proficient in using the medium, and have found it ideally suited for their 
goals. (More on that in the next chapter.) As a result, the government has 
continuously tightened the laws dealing with electronic communications. In 2000, the 
newspaper New Light of Myanmar announced a new crackdown on unauthorized use 
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of the email and telephone services. 151 According to the article, authorities claimed 
that foreigners were using sophisticated equipment to break the law. 
The "Computer Science Development Law," makes it illegal to "undermine 
state security, law and order, national unity, national economy and national culture, or 
[to] obtain or transmit state secrets." 152 The law is written in such a broad way that 
setting up a computer link without authorization also constitutes a crime. Thus, a 
tourist in Burma, dialing to a foreign internet provider from his own computer is 
technically in violation of the law. Punishment for using a modem or fax machine or 
making an internet link without a license is up to 15 years in prison, and it is so 
strictly enforced as to have caused a major international incident. A few years ago, 
diplomat Leo Nichols was arrested and sentenced to three years in jail for illegal 
possession of a fax machine. He later died in prison sparking a storm of international 
condemnation. 153 
Beyond the Internet, the Burmese postal authorities have made it illegal to 
own an unregistered mobile phone 154 a crime punishable by three years in prison and 
a steep fine. The spectrum of laws governing electronic communications widens 
constantly. Such communications are covered by earlier decrees dating back decades, 
which apply to all forms of journalism and written expression. New laws have been 
added every few years. But even when the laws are adhered to, the consequences can 
be difficult to predict. 
Two independent businessmen who had obtained the required licenses 
developed internet provider services which were shut down by the government in 
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December of 1999. 155 The military took over the provider, gaining full oversight over 
the communications of its few hundred subscribers. 
Subscribers to the government provider routinely become unable to send or 
receive email. Luxury hotels, which advertise overseas that they offer Internet access, 
perform feats of creativity when they try to explain to their customers why their 
internet service is down or working in strange ways. In one such exchange- my own 
experience -- an embarrassed hotel manager explained that incoming emails could not 
be received because of the downhill flow of the rain. For several months in early 
2000 the authorities blamed a total stoppage of email on the problem of Y2K. The 
simple explanation is that the government is desperately trying to gain control over 
electronic communications, an area where exiled dissidents have the upper hand. 
Restriction of Access to Outsiders 
Information gathered by outsiders has two uses. It can be smuggled back to 
Burma for domestic consumption, and it can be used to inform other nations about 
what happens in Burma. The reasons the generals seek to restrict the availability of 
information to the local population was discussed earlier. The reason the government 
is concerned about what the rest of the world hears about their country is slightly 
different. As noted, modernization theorists, as well as institutionalists, like 
Huntington and others, have counted foreign pressures as one of the forces that can 
trigger a transition towards democracy. Those pressures have been harshly felt in 
Burma, making it impossible for the government to disregard the sources of news that 
fan international calls for regime change in Burma. 
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Virtually all foreigners require a visa to enter the country, and the application 
for a visa requires background information, including profession. When the 
profession is journalist, writer, or any of a number considered potentially threatening 
by the regime, the application is routinely denied. 156 There have been a few 
exceptions to the rule that foreign journalists are not granted visas to work in Burma. 
CNN reporters and crews have entered the country following requests to interview 
government officials, at times when the regime deemed it useful to give such 
interviews. Nevertheless, Burma is largely off limits to journalists, unless they are 
willing to go in under false pretenses. That's what most do. Reporting from Rangoon 
does seep out to the world on something of a regular basis, as foreign journalists 
apply for and receive tourist visas. But even receiving a tourist visa can be a 
challenge. 
For example, Jean-Claude Buhrer of Le Monde requested a tourist visa in 
Bangkok. After his request was declined, an embassy secretary told him his name was 
on the fast-growing black list. He later managed to enter the country using a travel 
agency. He was expelled the day he arrived in Rangoon. 157 At the same time, major 
wire services do have staff working in the country. These journalists are Burmese 
nationals who work under strict restrictions and watch very carefully what they say, 
generally limiting their reports to translations from official sources, with little, if any 
contact with dissidents in the country. (Exiled dissidents do make their views known 
to journalists beyond Burma's borders.) 
The work of foreign journalists who do manage to get in is made particularly 
difficult by the draconian methods used to curtail freedom of speech. Talking to a 
92 
foreign journalist is against the law and punishable by stiff prison sentences. 158 
Journalists working legally in the country are seldom allowed to speak with Aung San 
Suu Kyi or members of the NLD. Some local reporters work as contributors to 
foreign-based opposition newspapers. They are, predictably, subject to harsh 
punishments if they are caught. 
Some observers believe that the SPDC's dismissive attitude toward foreign 
coverage (and toward the outside world, as a whole) can be traced, at least in part, to 
the country's colonial experience. One of the legacies of the experience is mistrust of 
the outside world and a poor understanding of the importance of internationalism for 
economic survival. 159 The Junta, nonetheless, is not totally without concern for 
foreign opinion, particularly as it sees that the opposition's successes in shaping 
public opinion overseas translates into economic sanctions, loss of foreign 
investment, and a stream of business closures. As a result, the government 
occasionally summons diplomats or even foreign journalists, or simply provides them 
with written responses to criticism. 
A typical case took place in late 1998, when the Myanmar Information 
Committee issued the tantalizingly entitled Information Sheet No. A-0640(I) and 
invited the diplomatic corps to hear its presentation. 160 The event was a way for the 
authorities to publicly attack the work of the NLD before international 
representatives, while offering its version of events. Diplomats were little swayed by 
statements such as this one, explaining the arrest of NLD members: "As you know, a 
number of NLD members have been staying at government guesthouses since 61h 
September, at the government invitation. They are being comfortably housed and well 
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fed, and they are being treated with courtesy and respect. The government has no 
wish to house them for any longer than necessary. Some of the NLD have returned 
home after a successful exchange of views to build a stable, multiparty democracy 
and to preserve the prevailing peace that Myanmar enjoys." 161 The SPDC, explained, 
as it does on a regular basis, that the measures it takes, which are interpreted by most 
as repressive, are a necessary part of a process that will eventually lead to multi-party 
democracy. The generals maintain they, as much as anyone else, are committed to 
democratic rule, when the time is right." ... As we look at other countries around the 
world," the statement explained, "[we see] political change and social unrest has 
resulted in rioting, looting, violent death and even civil war." Given this potential for 
mayhem, they said, democracy must be approached cautiously. ''There are some 
observers, both inside and outside Myanmar, who are demanding immediate changes. 
They believe that a country can transform itself into a functioning democracy 
overnight." 162 
That is the basic argument of the military Junta, that democracy, if allowed to 
happen quickly, will cause unacceptable social upheaval. It is an argument that has 
been used so frequently by this type of regime that, as noted earlier, modernization 
theorists can predict its use. 
Conclusion 
Modernization theory posits that modernization entails the expansion of 
power, "increased participation in politics by social groups." 163 This decentralization 
of power is inconsistent with the survival of a military regime. The reality of 
suppression of media freedoms in Burma is that it serves the purposes of the regime. 
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The authorities stall the advent of modernization in order to hold on to power. And 
just as the media have a key role to play in bringing about modernization, controlling 
the media is critical to hold modernization at bay. In Burma, the suppression of press 
freedoms is combined with the use of the media to highlight nationalist, traditionalist 
and religious traits of the country, another way to hold back the ultimately 
unstoppable arrival of the forces of modernization. 
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CHAPTERS: 
THE OPPOSITION'S USE OF THE MEDIA 
Introduction: The Opposition and the Basics of Modernization 
As a number of theorists have noted -- and as logic would indicate -- the very 
process of modernization involves a profound shift in an individual's view of him or 
herself with regard to the system. That shift requires moving from the belief that, to 
put it simply, things don't change, the prevailing belief in traditional societies, to a 
new view that the possibility of change does exist. In order to bring about such a 
fundamental transformation to a large number of people, it is necessary to start the 
type of learning process described by Lucian Pye and bring about the types of "new 
images" described by Pool. 164 More to the point, Lerner notes that the main elements 
of modernization are "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, 
education, [and] media participation ... " 165 His view is that the very introduction of 
modem ideas into a society can bring about modernization and economic 
development. In fact, he specifically notes that the media can play a pivotal role in 
triggering modernization. That view is echoed by Huntington when he says 
"modernization involves the tremendous expansion of man's knowledge about his 
environment and the diffusion of this knowledge though increased literacy, mass 
communication, and education."166 
Another key element in the theoretical framework is the importance of 
presenting the people with a concrete and believable alternative to the existing 
regime. Democratic transition theorists point to this as necessary for change. The 
media can play a major part in making the existence of the alternative known the 
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public. It can also play an important role in shaping the extent of a successful 
mobilization, as described Tilly 167 
The strategy of the Burmese opposition is rather clear in its embrace of 
modernization as a goal for the country. This can be seen in the very fact that they 
advocate democracy, given that democratization is a key component of 
modernization, as are other factors emphasized by the opposition, like expanded 
education and expanded political participation. While the authorities in Burma appear 
to be trying to prevent the process of modernization from gaining momentum, the 
counterweight to this effort is much more evident in the efforts of the opposition 
forces. More evident as well is their use of the media as the principal weapon of their 
struggle. As opposition leaders publicize their cause through a variety of media 
outlets, many of the principal factors that come into play in the process of 
modernization are easily identifiable in their statements. The very existence of an 
opposition movement, one seeking to bring democracy to a country where it is absent, 
indicates that the shift is taking place. At the very least, it has taken place among 
those people who count themselves members of the pro-democracy movement. 
Among those who are not part of that movement, it is crucial to bring about that shift 
in their belief system. To bring this about to a large number of people, the media is 
the ideal tool. 
Other basic aspects of modernization can be seen when analyzing the 
opposition's media work. The messages from Lerner, Huntington and other theorists 
about the ability of the media to help bring about change is not lost on the opposition. 
97 
It is not surprising, then, that the mass media is the weapon of choice in the work of 
pro-democracy forces. 
The opposition utilizes the press to reach the people inside and outside the 
country, tackling issues of cultural legitimacy, ethnic divisions, and leadership 
alternatives within in the country, while utilizing a number of new media 
technologies to align the rest of the world with its tactic of creating economic and 
political pressure on the regime. 
The Media in Opposition's Tactics 
The opposition operates from two principal bases. One is in Rangoon, the other 
in exile, in Bangkok. 168 From both of these places, the critical objectives of mobilizing 
public opinion, maintaining the public informed of the developments in the fight for 
democracy, and coordinating opposition activities, all require effective use of 
communications. 
Communications efforts are aimed at the population living in and out of the 
national borders. That includes Burmese dissidents and non-activists living in exile, 
as well as the non-Burmese public, a key audience in the process of leveraging 
international public opinion to bring pressure for change on the SPDC. 
Talking to the Public Inside Burma 
As noted earlier, symbols carry a great deal of power in traditional societies. 
When it comes to packaging the message in favor of modernization, movements that 
seek to bring change frequently find themselves couching their call for progress in the 
language of history. This happened in places like Japan, during its revolutionary 
period 169 and it is happening in today's Burma. 
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In order to achieve success, opposition groups seek to inform the people on 
whose behalf they claim to want political change about the progress of their endeavor. 
A revolutionary endeavor that, according to Tilly, requires three conditions, 
"coalitions of contenders advancing exclusive alternative claims, commitment to 
those claims, and a failure of the government to suppress them." 170 
The effort to reach the population within Burma requires a complicated set of 
editorial and logistical balancing acts. On the logistical side, the work is shared by 
activists inside and outside the country, mixing residents who operate on different 
levels of visibility and non-residents who stage daring cross-border activities to bring 
material into the country. 171 On the editorial side, the balancing act is just as delicate. 
The opposition has to tread carefully against a backdrop of a powerful government 
propaganda machine that casts their views in the light of xenophobia. The content of 
material designed to reach the Burmese masses has to be tailored to appeal to their 
traditional views, while at the same time helping to open their eyes to a wider world 
with new perspectives. 
Mindful of the power of tradition in the country, opposition leaders utilize 
symbols (as does the SPDC) to gain the hearts of traditional Burmese. When it comes 
to tradition, symbols carry enormous power. As mentioned in an earlier section, many 
of the principal figures in the opposition have adopted noms de guerre harking back 
to the best known moments of Burmese history. Two of the leaders of the 1988 
uprising, for example, are known as Min Ko Naing, meaning the Conqueror King and 
Nay Min, the Sun King. The use of the word Min, or King, echoes the era of Burmese 
Kingdoms, and position the opposition as legitimate adversaries to the current 
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"kings." Perhaps more important, from a symbolic point of view, is the insignia of 
one of the major opposition groups, the organization that coordinates most of the 
work of student activists. 
The ABSDF, the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, uses a logo that 
prominently features a peacock, another not-so-thinly veiled reference to the glory 
days of Burmese history when the king sat on the peacock throne. Opposition 
activists also utilize the power that numerology holds in the popular imagination. As 
noted earlier, the major uprising that marked a turning point in the democratization 
movement occurred in August of 1988, or 8-8-88. That was not lost on the military or 
on the people. When 9-9-99 approached, the opposition launched a media campaign 
calling for a general strike on that date. Some went further, with the ABSDF calling 
for an uprising on that date. 
The power of that date was such that the authorities were forced to 
acknowledge the widespread success of the underground media campaign calling for 
action on the day when all the 9s would merge together. A sharp crackdown by the 
military in advance of the upcoming troubles resulted in the detention of at least 500 
people and a tightening of security in high schools and Buddhist monasteries. 172 
Tackling Ethnic Division 
Bureaucratic authoritarian theorists have noted how authoritarian regimes tend 
to justify their existence by explaining that theirs is the only way to preserve national 
unity and prevent chaos. Additionally, theorists like Dankart Rustow 173 have 
underlined the need to create the kind of national identity where members of a 
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political entity have a clear conception of where they belong. In his view, national 
unity is a background condition required if a country is to move towards democracy. 
In the context of the Burma, this poses particular problems, because a 
significant portion of the population belongs to any of a number of ethnic minority 
groups. Moreover, membership in these minorities in many cases constitutes a more 
powerful component of national identity than does membership in Burmese society. 
This situation has given a mantle of legitimacy to the authorities' claim of needing a 
strong hand to keep the country together. It is not surprising, then, that an important 
feature of the opposition's work is an open effort to address the country's ethnic 
divisions as part of a concerted plan to form a united front. 
Just as the Junta has been at war, literally, against the militias of ethnic 
minorities, the opposition has formed a largely unified front. As an interesting detail, 
the name of the student organization named earlier, the ABSDF, starts with an "A" 
for "All." By including that word, the organization emphasizes that it includes every 
ethnic group, not only the majority ethnic Burmese. 
Efforts to create unity make tactical sense, as a way of strengthening the 
opposition. But their importance goes beyond that. It has to do with modernization, 
as noted at the outset, when it was explained that a sense of national identity- beyond 
an allegiance to a narrower ethnic group or clan, is one of the characteristics of 
modem society. It is interesting that a degree of national unification was achieved by 
the early nationalist leaders when they signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947. 
The opposition press seeks to get the word out about its success in developing 
an organization where the different ethnic groups work in harmony. By showing all 
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groups can work together within the opposition, the opposition undermines the 
government's claim that its authoritarian methods are the only ones that can avert a 
dismemberment of the country. 
While the number of opposition organizations is enormous, and their 
geographical locations amazingly diverse, their work is well coordinated. In 
December of 1998, 24 opposition groups met for the "Seminar on National 
Solidarity." The results of that meeting, known as the Thoo Mew Klo Agreement, 
were widely disseminated by the opposition press, with the very active internet 
website BurmaNet News playing a key role in getting the word out. The agreement 
highlighted the singleness of purpose of all opposition activists, regardless of their 
ethnic background, it reiterated the validity of the 1947 Panglong Agreement with its 
formula for solving the country's ethnic conflict and a call for the creation of a 
federal union- a solution many in Burma would presumably find more appealing 
than all out war against minorities. It also spelled out the demands, plans, and 
strategic outlook of the movement. The list of 24 signatories is a mosaic of Burmese 
diversity, beginning alphabetically with AI Burma Muslim Union, and including 
representatives of every single ethnic group. 174 
Getting the Word Out 
As development theorists have noted, the availability of a legitimate 
alternative to the regime is a prerequisite of political change. For opposition leaders, 
it is then necessary to communicate to the Burmese public the availability of a well-
organized and committed movement working to bring the rule of democracy to the 
country. But communicating this presents daunting challenges. 
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One of the most dangerous aspects of the opposition's work is in the vital job 
of distributing news within Burma's borders. Because the Internet is essentially non-
existent in the country, exiled leaders, with their sophisticated network of Internet 
sites, cannot rely on technology to get the word out to the population. Instead, printed 
newspapers smuggled into Burma are the principal means of getting straightforward 
news to the people. 175 
The newspaper New Era Journal is so familiar to authorities that the sentence 
for its possession is already a matter of law: anyone caught with a copy of the New 
Era Journal is sentenced to seven years in prison. The monthly newspaper, according 
to its founder U Tin Maung Win, is dedicated to "providing accurate news about what 
is happening in Burma."176 That, as noted earlier, is not something provided by local 
news outlets. The newspaper is produced by exiles in the Thai-Burmese border. 
Newsgathering activities inside Burma are all conducted as a clandestine operation, 
and distribution is a veritably death-defying feat. Every month, the paper prints 
15,000 copies, 15 percent are distributed to various countries where exiled Burmese 
live, while 85 percent are secretly smuggled across the border and quickly distributed 
by volunteer members of several pro-democracy organizations. Editors believe their 
work reaches a number much greater that that, as each copy is shared by several 
people. Many copies are also photocopied and distributed even more widely. 
Activists in Burma, member of the National League for Democracy, also 
produce and distribute their own publications. Their ability to succeed in their efforts, 
however, is more limited, as the government closely watches their activities. Arrests 
of NLD members engaged in these activities are occasionally reported in the press. 
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The official New Light of Myanmar 171, for example, reported the results of an 
investigation into the production and distribution of anti-government pamphlets. 
According to the article, the production was traced to the town of Yay, where NLD 
members were promptly arrested. According to that report, the NLD members were 
reporting the "fabrications" of Radio Free Asia, a station operated by exiled 
opposition groups from across the border, with funding from the U.S. 
Some of the efforts by opposition activists and other journalists take place in 
plain sight, as opposition journalists and other writers resort to what we could call 
literary devices to get their message out. The method consists of writing material that 
appears to be about one topic, one that would seem harmless to censors, while in 
reality writing about another. The favorite device is metaphor. 
Exiled writers describe the process as difficult and even exhausting. One of 
the difficulties is achieving the right level of cover, one that will not be pierced by the 
censors, while at the same time not being too subtle for readers. Tin Maung Than, an 
exiled writer, used this system for a long time. According to him, writing under 
censorship is an art in itself. 178 He explained how, for example, to write about the life 
of fear experienced by the people of Burma, he would write stories about children's 
fear and its impact on society, offering tiny hints that he wasn't really talking about 
children. 
A commonly used device is to recount stories from the country's history, 
where the moral can easily be applied to the present. Other tricks include outsmarting 
the sensor by bringing one very critical article along with a seemingly harmless one, 
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knowing that the censor will focus his attention on the tough piece, and spend less 
time examining the other179. 
Talking to the World 
As Huntington 180 has noted, outside actors can have a powerful impact on 
political change. Similarly, economic pressure plays a role in political development, 
although the exact impact of incomes is a matter of debate among theorists. In today' s 
trade-intensive world economy, outside actors can have a tremendous influence on 
the economic fortunes of a nation. This is particularly true of Burma, where the 
opposition has chosen to support the imposition of economic sanctions, in an effort to 
bring the military regime to its knees. In order to muster the international political 
support for economic sanctions, pro-democracy activists rely largely on the media. 
The efforts of Burmese dissidents to spread their message outside the region 
sometimes result in foreign activists taking their idealistic work into the heart of the 
SPDC. One such case is the continuing saga of British citizen James Mawdsley, who 
has repeatedly entered the country, been arrested and later released by the authorities. 
In 1999 Mawdsley, a human rights activist, was sentenced to 17 years in prison for 
entering the country illegally and distributing pro-democracy materials. It was 
Mawdsley's third arrest by Burmese authorities. Just one year earlier he had served 
almost three months of a 7-year prison term. 
The government had agreed to release him on condition that he never return. 
After the 1999 arrest, the British government, along with human rights activists and 
Mawdsley's family, launched a determined campaign to press for his release. After 14 
months in solitary confinement, the authorities turned him loose, insisting they did 
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not give in to pressure. Instead, they maintained the release was based on 
humanitarian grounds, because Mawdsley was "mentally deficient" and had "an 
addled brain." In an article in the government-controlled press, the authorities 
explained this was an example of "tolerance, forbearance and compassion ... typical 
Myanmar characteristics."181 
In many respects, bringing Burma's message to the world is easier than 
bringing Burmese news to the people still living in the country. On the other hand, 
activists trying to promote their cause have to compete with an endless number of 
other causes vying for the world's attention. Still, opposition forces have managed to 
make their situation a cause celebre among human rights activists around the world. 
Once their efforts to publicize their plight resulted in the awarding of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese struggle for democracy secured its place on 
the international agenda. 
Technology and Politics 
The characteristics of the Internet have proven ideal for the purposes of the 
Burmese opposition, who have used the medium masterfully. A large number of 
websites are kept up to date on developments in Burma and developments in any 
place with repercussions in Burma. The medium has allowed for up-to-the minute 
mobilizations and easy coordination of the work carried out by tens, if not hundreds 
of thousands of people and scores of organizations scattered throughout the world. 
The need to coordinate work in many countries was born out of the wide 
distribution of Burmese exiles, a problem whose solution brought unexpected 
benefits. By learning to reach to every comer of the planet, activists managed to enlist 
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the active support of groups whose agendas are not specifically oriented to change in 
.. 
Burma. Suddenly the Burmese cause was embraced by organizations dedicated to the 
promotion of human rights, a free press, democracy, and an assortment of entities 
grouped around anti-globalization themes. 
Additionally, as activists developed mailing lists to keep their own members 
informed, the mailing lists became available as a source of information for non-
Burmese activists. Suddenly, Burmese pro-democracy leaders found the ability to 
quickly and easily mobilize millions of people to their cause. By emailing their 
enormous list of activists and other concerned people throughout the world, the pro-
democracy movement is able to exert much greater pressure than it could do without 
this technology. This pressure, applied upon influential governments, has helped to 
carry out the wishes of the activists. It has also helped develop new sources of 
funding for the movement by raising the international understanding and concern for 
what goes on in their isolated nation. Activists have garnered important benefactors 
such as billionaire George Soros, and have managed to make a permanent place on 
the world agenda for their cause. 
The Media and Economic Pressure 
One of the key elements of the pro-democracy strategists' plan is to bring the 
SPDC to its knees by denying it the economic life-blood that is foreign investment. 
To succeed with this effort, skillful use of the media has been an imperative. It is fair 
to say that the Burmese opposition counts with the support of the West. Western 
governments, at the urging of activists and their followers, frequently express their 
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contempt for the military regime. On the other hand, actions that go beyond words are 
more difficult to bring about. 
The NLD and its supporters have long called for a worldwide economic 
boycott against the ruling Junta. The appeal has been made by Aung San Suu Kyi, 
whose words are reported around the world. Not all activists support an economic 
boycott because without question it makes the lives of people in Burma more 
difficult. Still, that is the official position of the movement, and it was officially 
reiterated in the official Thoo Mwe Klo agreement. By repeatedly publicizing their 
call for a boycott and mobilizing their supporters to bring pressure upon governments 
around the world to enforce a boycott, the pro-democracy movement has managed to 
create very real and problematic economic isolation for the SPDC. 182 
The isolation is not absolute, but it is pervasive. In 1997, the U.S. imposed a 
ban on all new investments in Burma183 . The European Parliament has passed a 
resolution urging all EU member nations to refrain from trading with the country184. 
(France opposes sanctions and continues to deal with the SPDC.) Canada joined the 
EU and the US in placing sanctions on Burma, withdrawing any preferential tariff 
treatment, and urged the business community to refrain from entering into new 
investments. 185 
Activists have also used the media to bolster specific tactical moves to further 
economic sanctions. When the SPDC, seeing the enormous success of Thailand's 
tourism industry, decided to promote the country as a tourist destination, the 
opposition counter-attacked, mobilizing its communications systems to tell the world 
not to visit Burma, not to give their dollars to the military regime. When the Lonely 
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Planet network of travel books continued to publish a travel guide to Myanmar, 
activists organized a boycott of the book. Aung San Suu Kyi, using the limited media 
at her disposal, continues to urge foreigners not to visit her country as long as the 
military are still in control. 186 The vast media network of the pro-democracy 
movement disseminates her message. 
The policy is controversial, even among activists, but it remains the official 
position of Suu Kyi and her followers, and the results are plain to see. While 
neighboring countries like Thailand and Malaysia enjoys as many as 10 million 
visitors a year, official figures indicate Burma had just 200,000 visitors last year, and 
only 120,000 of them were tourists. 187 
Keeping the Struggle on the Front Page 
Despite the country's isolation, activists often manage to put it on the front 
pages of the international media. One such incident occurred in August 2000. Aung 
San Suu Kyi, had been released from house arrest for only a few days when she set 
out from Rangoon to an NLD meeting outside of the city. Shortly after she left her 
home with 14 members of her National League for Democracy party, the journey 
came to an abrupt stop when uniformed men blocked their way, ordering them to 
return to the capital. Suu Kyi and her supporters refused to tum back. The air was let 
out of her tires and a nine-day test of wills ensued. 188 
The group camped by the side of the road in sweltering heat, refusing to give 
up their efforts. The military finally took them back by force to Rangoon. The party 
leaders -- including Suu Kyi -- were taken to their homes, locked up and placed under 
heavy guard. With the international media kept away, and the local media firmly in 
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government control, the SPDC might have expected the incident to pass without 
.. 
notice. But it was not to be. While official media outlets referred to a minor incident 
in which the government was actually protecting Suu Kyi from hard, Burmese groups 
in exile mobilized their media machine and, before long, the real story was in 
virtually every newspaper. 
By the time Suu Kyi was forced back home, to house arrest, the story of the 
nine-day standoff had entered the annals of the history of the Burmese pro-democracy 
struggle. More importantly, it had become an international affair brought up at the 
highest levels of international diplomacy. 
The incident occurred at a time when a major gathering of world leaders was 
taking place at the United Nations Millennium Summit. When U.S. president Bill 
Clinton's time at the podium came, he made it a point to chastise the generals in 
Rangoon. "We face another test today in Burma where a brave and popular leader, 
Aung San Suu Kyi, once again has been confined, with her supporters in prisons and 
her country in distress, in defiance of repeated UN resolutions," Clinton said. 189 
Clinton likened the Burmese regime to those of Iraq and Serbia, both places he had 
ordered attacked by U.S. military forces . Tony Blair of Britain was just as blunt at the 
U.N., saying "the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi by the Burmese regime is a 
disgrace," adding, "I call upon the Burmese government to let her go free and I call 
on fellow world leaders to back that call." 190 
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Spotlighting the Heroes 
As noted, the presence of a viable opposition, particularly one lead by 
charismatic individuals, is an important part of the theoretical model of transition to 
democracy. The theory, however, tends to focus on the impact this has on the views 
of populations within the country in question. But when the international community 
is a major player in the democratization struggle, the existence of respected 
individuals in a well-organized opposition structure can help galvanize global 
support. 
The efforts of the Burmese opposition media have garnered the attention of a 
number of organizations, not only because of the heroic work of many journalists and 
the horrific price many of them pay for their work, but also because their 
communications machine ensures that their heroic do not go unnoticed by 
organizations seeking heroes to honor. Burmese journalists are frequently cited for 
journalism and human rights awards by major international organizations. The awards 
help bring notice to the overall cause of the opposition, while pressuring the 
government to loosen the reins on journalists. 
On World Press Freedom Day, for example, the United Nations awarded the 
Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize to 71-year-oldjournalist U Win Tin. The 
former editor of the independent daily Hanthawaddy has been in prison since 1989, 
living in what was a kennel for prison guard dogs. 191 As was noted during the award 
ceremony, the military gave him the opportunity to go free if he agreed to renounce 
all political activities. He refused. U Win Tin was severely beaten and crippled by 
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guards. When he managed to expose details about prison conditions to a United 
Nations human rights official, he was transferred to the current facility, deprived of 
writing materials and most human contact. His original 14-year sentence was 
extended by an additional seven years. U Win Tin was informed of the prize, and 
managed to smuggle out a statement accepting the prize. His fame among human 
rights activists has continued to grow. He has been awarded the Golden Pen Freedom 
Award His case is the subject of letter-writing campaigns and diplomatic pressure 
upon the SPDC. 192 
As the result of this pressure, journalists and activists are occasionally freed as 
good-will symbols by the SPDC, which now appears more inclined to show a more 
conciliatory face to the world. 
International Organizations 
By using the media to mobilize support and publicize a situation that might 
otherwise be completely unknown to the world, the opposition has managed to 
involve some of the world's most powerful players in their struggle. Until now, the 
SPDC remains firmly entrenched, but there are signs of progress. 
The economic boycott has contributed to the crumbling of the country's 
infrastructure. The situation has grown so critical that the generals' hand is being 
forced. They may want to keep modernization at bay to maintain their grip on power, 
but the level of poverty and despair among the people is intensifying to the point 
where there is speculation that a nearly suicidal uprising could emerge spontaneously 
from people with nothing left to loose. 
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The government reacted with great worry when the International Labor 
Organization, hearing opposition reports of the government's use of forced labor by 
the government, sent a delegation to study the problem. The ILO's conclusion was 
that the authorities routinely use forced labor and that strong measures should be 
taken if the practice does not stop. The ILO's report, not surprisingly, was widely 
publicized by the opposition. The SPDC vowed to put an end to the practice, fearing a 
further tightening of sanctions.193 
Another major victory by the opposition was the appointment of a special 
rapporteur on Burma. With this envoy corning directly from the UN Secretary 
General, the SPDC has been forced to allow some latitude to his investigations. As a 
result of the efforts of the UN' s envoy, the SPDC claims to be holding genuine talks 
with Suu Kyi. Large numbers of prisoners have been freed, but Suu Kyi herself 
remains under house arrest. 
Conclusion -- Modernization, Media and Opposition 
In Tilly's analysis of revolution, he notes the importance for political 
movements seeking regime change of attaining "commitment to [their] claims by a 
significant segment of the subject population." 194 This is a condition that requires 
communicating with large numbers of people, a job that almost by definition belongs 
to the mass media. For this reason, it is not surprising that the media constitutes 
crucial tool in affecting political change. 
Clearly, the opposition has proven adept at using mass communications as the 
principal tactical weapon of its struggle. Its larger strategic mission, though, is one of 
accelerating the process of modernization in the country. The way this is being done 
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is by introducing new ideas that go beyond traditional Burmese thought, by 
developing a network of information for the population, by developing a sense of 
national unity that transcends ethnicity and religion, by promoting the value of 
democratic principles among the population, and by creating enormous economic and 
political pressure for change on the government. 
The ultimate result of this strategy, until now, has not been success. The 
Burmese military continues to hold absolute power in the country. Nevertheless, there 
are signs that the Junta's will to keep power at all cost is beginning to crack, and the 
opposition may well achieve victory. 
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CONCLUSION 
As this analysis has demonstrated, political development theory is useful in 
providing a framework for understanding the ongoing conflict in Burma, and 
presenting the concepts that help explain why the mass media play such a critical role 
on both sides of the dispute. Still, a review of the leading schools of thought in the 
field indicates that there is no single existing model that fits the Burmese case in its 
entirety. In fact , it appears that each perspective helps explain the role of only some 
of the relevant factors at play. 
The conflict in Burma, where a military regime has survived for some 40 
years, defies easy categorization. While military governments have collapsed the 
world over and socialist regimes have been pushed aside by democratization forces, 
the generals in Burma have kept a firm grip on power. The dynamics of political 
conflict there contain unique characteristics that make predicting the outcome of the 
conflict on the basis of other countries' experiences much more difficult, though not 
impossible. 
By systematically examining the utilization of the media by both sides in the 
conflict, this thesis has juxtaposed the existing academic theories seeking to explain 
political change against the real-life experience of one country, looking at the 
mechanics that govern the day-to-day struggle between a regime intending to hold on 
to power and the opposition seeking to dislodge it. The media is an important cog in 
the wheel of this political machinery, and it helps us understand in greater detail what 
the strategies of each side are. Political theory, on the other hand, offers a number of 
generic blueprints against which this machinery can be placed. The combination of 
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the two offer the kind of understanding that can, in the end, provide a framework for 
predicting the ultimate outcome of this conflict, or at least point to the important 
factors that will play an important role in determining that outcome. 
Traditional modernization theorists posit that economic development and 
social mobilization create the conditions that trigger the process of political change. 
In their view, the engine of political change is the social mobilization created by 
economic change. The process becomes a circular chain of causation, where 
economic changes create social changes, which in tum stimulate political change, 
which itself leads to more economic change. Key to this process is the role of the 
economy, and the role of information and new ideas acquired by individuals, as 
urbanization and the search for new markets exposes them to new worldviews. 
Institutionalist theorists, for their part, argue that the basic process described 
by modernization does not always explain the movement or lack of movement 
towards democracy. Instead, they focus on political institutions. These theorists argue 
that political stability depends on the ability of institutions to handle the changes 
brought on by the process of mobilization. The type of government is not really 
important, they say. Rather, what matters is its ability to handle political and social 
pressures. A pivotal argument of the distinguished institutional theorist Samuel 
Huntington, states that the very process of modernization creates instability. While a 
modem political system tends to be stable, the process of modernization engenders 
instability. Hence, the challenge for authoritarian regimes -- the "King's Dilemma"-
how to bring about change without losing power in the process. 
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Bureaucratic- Authoritarian theorists look at the structure of power and find 
that the key to political change can be found within the regime itself. They point to 
schisms within the authoritarian regime as developing cracks eventually lead to the 
crumbling of the regime and movement towards democracy. Additionally, these 
theorists note that authoritarian regimes only engage in liberalization when they are 
under pressure from a serious crisis. 
Democratic transition theorists focus on the process of transformation from 
authoritarian to democratic government. They believe that the evolution of structures 
that are separate from the regime itself is an important part of the process. 
Additionally, they consider the existence of a credible alternative to the existing 
government to be one of the fundamental requirements of political change. In other 
words, they see two processes occurring simultaneously, the gradual disintegration of 
on regime, and the gradual consolidation of an alternative structure. The move from 
authoritarianism to democracy, then, requires that the opposition undermine the 
regime as it strengthens itself. If this stage meets with success, the next likely 
scenario would involve bargaining between the elites on both sides, leading to 
political change. 
Finally, the work of Burmese theorists points to the enormous power of 
tradition in Burma, and the lingering influence from the country's colonial experience 
in shaping today' s conflict. 
Clearly, no single theory completely explains Burma; together they offer an 
explanation of the process occurring there, and the importance of the press in that 
process. Modernization theory's emphasis on the role of new ideas shows why the 
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opposition has found the media so important for mobilizing support for change. The 
institutionalists' focus on the instability that takes place during a period of 
modernization explains why the Burmese regime finds it necessary to forestall change 
to maintain stability and power. The process they are trying to forestall is one in 
which the availability of information plays a key role, hence the strict control of the 
mass media by the Junta, and the enormous emphasis on media expansion by the 
opposition. Bureaucratic authoritarian theory points to a developing crack in the 
foundation of military rule, the development of competing factions within the 
military. The pro-democracy opposition has sought to highlight these divisions and 
even encourage them. Authoritarian theories maintain an underdeveloped setting 
encourages authoritarianism. For this reason, it is understandable that, while the 
opposition actively promotes certain aspects of modernization through its use of the 
media, the government does exactly the opposite, focusing on the country's history, 
culture and traditions. 
From democratic transition theory the most important contribution to our 
understanding of today's Burma is its focus on the importance of available 
alternatives. This clearly explains why the regime has used its control of the means of 
communication to discredit the opposition and show it as a crumbling relic of 
colonialism, while the opposition has sought to publicize the existence of a well-
organized and functioning government in exile. Further, the opposition has sought to 
bring about a crisis by fomenting a massive economic embargo that is bringing the 
country to its knees. 
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The power of the country's tradition, the deep-seated mistrust of foreigners 
following the colonial experience, and the national aversion to disorder noted by 
Burmese theorists, explains why both sides have sought to appropriate the country's 
tradition and exploit the issue of national ethnic divisions for their own political gain. 
The tactical work on this aspect of each side's strategy is conducted by creating 
images and messages in the mass media. 
On the basis of these theories, there is reason to believe the pro-democracy 
forces will eventually succeed in changing the regime. They have presented the 
population and the rest of the world with a credible alternative, developing a political 
party with a recognized leader and earning a strong victory in a popular election, and 
later, after finding themselves unable to take power, producing documents detailing 
their plans for government, and continuing to function as an active opposition party. 
Additionally, they have succeeded in contributing to a major economic crisis in the 
country. The government's heavy spending on weapons, couple with its 
mismanagement of the economy and economic sanctions have brought on a severe 
economic crisis. 195 Evidence of the growing crisis is the continuing slide of the value 
of Burma's currency, as well as the steady stream of foreign companies moving 
suspending trade with the country. This crisis will reach critical mass in the not-too-
distant future, as the Junta runs out of money to pay soldiers. Reports of soldiers 
extorting food and money from villagers are increasing. 196 Further evidence of the 
severity of the situation is the government's new willingness to negotiate with the 
opposition or, at the very least, it's determination to appear before the international 
community to be negotiating. The economic crisis may also contribute to the 
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developing schism in the regime, which itself will gain momentum with the 
approaching retirement of the leading general. It is possible that the beginning of the 
end for the regime has already started, and that we are already seeing the predicted 
bargaining between the elites on both sides. Still, the road ahead will not be easy for 
the opposition. The government is well entrenched, and the masses, though 
supportive of the pro-democracy leadership, have grown disillusioned. To accelerate 
the process of change, the opposition will continue to utilize all the means of mass 
communications at its disposal with an eye toward mobilizing the population within 
Burma and shoring up international support for its efforts. 
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